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TENNANT'S IDEA OF THE SOUL AS RELATED TO
HIS DOCTRINE OF THE PERSONALITY OF GOD
INTRODUCTION
The ideas of the soul and God have stood at the heart
of philosophical and theological speculation ever since man
"began to think of himself and the universe. The present paper
deals with those two ideas from the point of view of one man,
F. R. Tennant. In the year 1928 he brought from the University
Press in Cambridge the first of a two volume treatise called
Philosophical Theology . This first volume deals with the soul
and its faculties, a general philosophical background for the
theology of his second volume. This ’’Fellow of Trinity College
and Lecturer in the University of Cambridge” brought out the
second volume in 1930. It is entitled. The World
,
The Soul
and God . In the preface to this work Tennant points the stu-
dent to the fact that,
"This work is intended primarily for stu-
dents of philosophical theology, or of those
tracts of philosophy which have bearing on the
cognitive basis of religion: the field that is
usually and less aptly called philosophy of
religion. But it covers so much of the fields of
psychology and epistemology, that it is hoped to
prove not without use to such as read those
subjects without paramount interest in their
theological bearing." 1
This formidable work is most challenging to the student
of theology and philosophy, if not to a thinker in any field,
because of its comprehensiveness. The clear style in which
it is written, however, helps some. Tennant points out that.
1 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, p. v.
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2"The student of theology needs to know what
Is known, and to be acquainted with the main types
of theory, concerning the self as knower, its
capacities and faculties, and concerning the world
and our science thereof, in so far as such knowledge
bears upon his own quest. He must therefore be
equiped with learning in psychology and theory of
knowledge; he must have some acquaintance with the
facts and theories, with the methods and the
limitations, of the natural sciences; and he must
be familiar with the outstanding systems of
metaphysic ." 2
The work begins and rests upon Ward* s Psychological Principles
,
which he regards as "the greatest single work, of any age, on
the human mind." 3
In the main, Tennant sets for himself a high standard
in following the style of Ward, for he deals with the present
work in the empirical style. He begins open-mindedly, follows
the logical lines of his procedure, and makes no dogmatic
assertions. In many places he arrives by his empirical method
to a conclusion that one would assume from the a priori method,
yet he sets out without preconceived notions. His method, as
he says, is the ordo cognoscendi
,
and deliberately chosen.
His desire is to give to the student "material on which to
whet his critical faculty." 4
The specific purpose of the thesis is one of internal
criticism, i.e., to establish Tennant 1 s idea of the soul and
his doctrine of the personality of God as they are expounded
throughout his work, and to relate the same. For the purpose
of clearness of thought, the paper will assume the following
2 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, p. v.
3 Ibid., I, p. vii.
4 Ibid., I, p. vi.
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3outline. First a discussion of the history of the idea of the
soul, for there have been conflicting notions of it throughout
the ages. Secondly, in order to clearly see Tennant* s position,
it is almost imperative to investigate contemporary philoso-
phical and psychological ideas of the soul* The extreme on
the one hand is complete denial of the existence of the soul
and God, and on the other the postulation of both without
intellectual grounding. Tennant attempts intellectually to
establish the existence of both and attribute to them definite
characteristics. Hence upon that intellectually historical
and contemporaneous basis one can firmly establish and clearly
see in perspective Tennant's specific ideas of both. From
that point the discussion leads into Tennant's doctrine of the
personality of God, then a consideration of the relationship
of his two concepts, and finally to a criticism and conclusion.
Tennant, by virtue of his position, exerts
influence upon thinkers both abroad and in this country. He
is not thoroughly and consistently in line with the Boston
University tradition for he has been termed a panpsychistic
personalist. Yet to follow through his ideas of the soul and
God is both a refreshing and a stimulating study.
The main sources for this study are: Tennant's
Philosophical Theology in two volumes, articles by him in
"Mind,” a London quarterly and The Future of Christianity,
edited by Sir James Marchant, lectures by Dr. Albert C. Knudson,
and a few standard works in the fields of theology, philosophy,
and psychology.
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I. HISTORY OP THE IDEA OF THE SOUL
In discussing the soul Tennant follows a long train of
thinkers, for the idea of the soul dates hack to prehistoric
times. Prom the experience of dreams and trances, as well
as death, the primitive came to believe in the existence of
something in his nature that was invisible. He was without
categories of metaphysics, science or theology, yet,
"Observations of the facts of life and
death, of sleep and unsciousness, led him to
the theory that there was something in him that
caused him to move and speak and live. This
something was the soul." 1
There were various ideas of the soul. It was not
necessarily immaterial, other than physical. To the primitive
it was
"simply a being of a more subtle essence,
generally invisible but not always intangible,
subject in a certain measure to all the
limitations of human beings, but endowed at the
same time with mysterious faculties." 2
One theory was that the soul was a pale and vague image of the
body itself. Sometimes it was thought of as a breath (from
the Latin anima, Greek pneuma, Hebrew ruah), or as beats of
the heart. Again, it was thought of in a special form of life
as birds, serpents, meteors, wreaths of vapor, etc. 4 There
were those who regarded the soul as a power, the active part
or life principle itself. The latter arose from the rather
mystifying experience of the passing of life with the shedding
IBrightman, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 173.
2Hastings, Encyclopedia oT^Religion and Ethics,* I, p. 536.
3McDougall, Body and MincTT p. l; Cf.7~Knudson, Doctrine of
4 Hastings, Op. Git., p. 536. Redemption, p.~9T~.
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5of blood.
Further than this, the mystifying power was felt in all
nature, in the trees and in the animals. The problems were
solved by animism. Everything in nature came to be inhabited
%
by souls
.
Greek Thought on the Idea of the Soul
In tracing the historical development of the soul idea
the Greek thinkers immediately come into the foreground. In
Homeric verse the self was largely indentified with the body.
Archilochus expresses in "To His Soul" that the soul is the
central core of man’s nature. Sappho speaks of her soul, but it
6
is bound to a "Dread power" . Pindar elevates the idea of the
soul. In "Prometheus Bound" Aeschylus uses the theme "I am
captain of my soul." Sophocles denies the individuality of the
soul, and Euripides gives it no place in his writing.
Preceding Socratic thought, Anaximenes held that the soul
7
was air. Democritus expresses the idea that the soul was com-
posed of matter in its most mobile form, of subtle, smooth,
8
round atoms, like those of fire. According to Socrates there
was little anticipation for the immortal life of the soul.Death
for him brings complete unconsciousness, a dreamless sleep, or a
transition of the soul to another life in the realm of souls."
5 Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy
,
p. 173.
6 Vi/right, Masterpieces of Greek Literature
,
p. 55.
8 Knudson, Doctrine of Redemption
, p. 95 .
7 Thilly, History of Philosophy, p. 18.
9 Rohde, Psyche, p. 464
..
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6The first great advance in the development of the con-
ception of the soul was due to Plato, the first to work out
the sharp distinction between soul and body. According to
him the soul is immaterial, "made up of will and thought, joy
and grief, and the like, more noble than the body, living be-
fore the body lives and after the body dies." 10 For him the
soul was a pure spiritual essence, containing nothing material
within it. It is incorporeal and belongs to the realm of the
invisible. It is in itself the essence of Being and Becoming.
It is enclosed in the body but remains a stranger to it. 1 "**
Plato thus transcended the earlier material dualism by
substituting a dualism of which one factor was immaterial and
fl
!2
spiritual, a "radical dualism of matter and spirit."
In Aristotle there is a rise of emphasis upon the
activistic nature of the soul. He accepted Plato *3 doctrine
of the soul f s immateriality, but he conceived of it as immanent
13
in the body. This inaugurated a ne?/ stage in the history
of psychology. For him the soul is the vital principle, the
14
moving force of the body.
Following this immaterial emphasis upon the soul, there
came revived materialistic conceptions in Epicureanism and
Stocism. The Epicureans contributed little that was new in
the idea of the soul. They went back to the teaching of
10 Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy
,
p. 174.
H Rohde, Psyche
, p. 464*
12 Knudson, Doctrine of Redemption
,
p. 95
13 Ibid.
,
p. 96
.
14 King, Behaviorism, a Battle Line, p. 347*
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Democritus in maintaining that the soul was material like all
other things, though a refined and mobile matter. 15 To the
Stoic "the soul is a material substance, a spark of the divine
fire." 16 Within the school there was a difference of opinion
as to whether all souls existed until the "universal confla-
gration" or only the wise; l7yet the body was called the prison
house of the soul by Roman Stoics even at the time of Christ.
Jewish, Greek, and Early Christian Thought
"Y/hen Christianity entered the world of Graeco-Roman
thought," writes Dr. Knudson, "It found itself confronted with
19
different views of the soul, " Toward these views it
took an attitude commensurate with its rich heritage of Hebrew
literature and the teachings of Jesus Christ. In the Bible
the view of the soul as the principle of life is present, but
not in the same meaning of the vital principle as vised by
Aristotle. Soul in the Old Testament was nephesh . This was
materialistic, in line with traditional animism, yet it implied
a principle rather than any material existence. This principle
was realized by Jeremiah, in v/hom "personal religion came to
self-consciousness." It was he who first made the soul of the
Oft
individual the true seat of religion.' Philosophically this
soul was a "semi-physical, semi-spiritual something, a potent
15 Thilly, A History of Philosophy
, p. 101*
16 Ibid., p. Ill •
bl7 Windelband, A History of Philosophy
,
p. 187*
18 Morris, Six Theories of the Mind, p. 21.
19 Knudson, Doctrine of TTedemptTon
,
p. 96.
20 Knudson, Beacon Lights of Prophecy, pp. 166-167.
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reality, not to be identified with the breath, but the occult
gl
cause of the breathing;...." x In the New Testament psyche
meant the soul, as did pneuma . Both were assumed to be
analogous to breath and to be of a highly refined material
nature. Nowhere in the Biblical writing does the soul receive
expression as immaterial, yet the vital principle of life was
built upon this vaguely conceived soul of the individual.
Hence the animism of Hebrew thought was in line with popular
Greek thought and Stoic modes of thought, while the Christian
emphasis upon future life was more in line with Neoplatonic
22
thinking
.
The greatest thinker of the period, Plotinus, in working
out his philosophy of systematizing the main doctrines of
Greek and Hellenistic philosophy under the religious principle,
23
emphasized the immateriality of the substance of the soul.
24
The soul was for Plotinus a part of the world soul. And
from his writings comes the statement that in making a division
between the sensible and intelligible nature of man, one
should "place the soul in the intelligible."25
The problem then for Christianity, was to decide whether
it should continue to think of the soul as refined matter or
should accept the spiritual view of it as wholly immaterial.
8
21 Hastings, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol.VIII,p. 31,
22 Knudson, Doctrine of Redemption
,
p. 94 •
23 Windelband, A History of Philosophy, p. 215.
24 Thilly, A History of Philo sophy, p. 130 Cf. Knudson, Doctrine
~ of Redemption
,
p. 96 .
25 Plotinus, "On the Essence of the Soul"
,
(Lib . 2., Enn. 4)
Cf. Three Treatises of Plotinus ,Trans . T. M. Johnson, p. 14
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Opinion on the subject varied for several centuries. It
will be well, therefore, to consider the ideas of the soul
extant in the Christian theologians.
In the first period of Christian doctrinal history
there was a marked distinction between body and soul. Platonic
influence was here felt in the teaching that the body and the
soul existed together in the same place in the world without
27being in vital relationship to each other. In regard to
the materiality of the soul, some felt that it was incorporeal,
while others held to the materialistic conception of the soul*s
nature.2®
Justin Martyr contended that the body is the house of
the soul. This bears the marks above noted that the soul and
the body dwell together yet without vital relationship.
29
Justin also saw that the soul is the house of the spirit.
In discussing the person of Christ, Justin wrote that He became
an
the whole rational being, body and reason and soul.'- This
three view nature of man, the trichotomist theory, holds that
man consists of soul, spirit, and body. For Justin immortality
31
was dependent upon the works of the soul.'"
Following Justin in this "Threefold’ 1 view of man are
32Irenaeus and the greater number of Greek Fathers. Tatian
26 Knudson, Doctrine of Redemption, pp. 96-97
.
27 Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrine, I, p. 102.
28 Ibid., p. 102 .
29 Justin Martyr, De Resurr., X»
30 Justin Martyr, l£poiogia7 II, p. 10 •
31 Thilly, A History of Philosophy, p. 142 .
32 Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrine, I, p. 101 •
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(130) a pupil of Justin Martyr, does not give much systematic
thought to the soul, yet writes, "my soul being taught of Gocl,
implying a spiritual conception of the soul. This spiritual
conception is a carry over from Irenaeus who "distinguishes
the psychical breath of life, which is of a temporal nature
and bound to the body, from the animating spirit, which is
in its nature eternal.' 34
Some of the leading theologians, however, advocated the
materialistic view. 55 Tertullian of the Latin school, was a
spokesman for this group, holding that man is made of tv/o
factors, body and soul, the dichotomist view. His philosophic
standpoint was that of Stoicism rather than that of Platonism.
He writes in a materialistic vein saying that a soul may be
shattered. 36 Further he writes,
"All that is real is the body. The
corporeality of God does not detract from his
sublimity, nor that of the soul from its
immortality.... The soul has the human form
the same as its body, only it is delicate,
clear and ethereal The soul then we
define to be sprung from the breath of God,
immortal, possessing body, having form, simple
in its substance, intelligent in its own nature,
developing its powers in various ways, free in
its determinations, subject to growth by
opportunity, in its faculties mutable, rational,
supreme, endued with an insti^t of presentiment,
evolved out of one original 5 ^
This early period, with Tertullian, Tatian, Irenaeus,
Arnobius, Lactantius, Jerome, and Hilary of Poitiers, tended
33 Schraff
,
History of the Christian Church, II, p. 727 „
34 Y/indelband, A rfis'^o’ry of Philosophy, p . 232
35 Knudson, PocTrTne of Redemption
, p. 97 #
36 Tertullian, De Jejun., p. 3.
37 Knudson, Doctrine of Redemption, p. 97.
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on the whole toward corporeality.
Origen, in contrast to the above mentioned, held from
his background of Platonism that the soul was immaterial. His
theory of pre-existence died with him, yet he contributed
to the thought of his day. While the soul was for him
immaterial, it did imply a body. He says,
"The spirit is with the soul as a master
and director, associated with it to remind it of
the good, and to accuse and punish it for its
faults The soul which is exalted by
following the spirit, and not only following but
being transformed into spirit, must put off its
nature as soul, and become spiritual.’1,59
The spirit is here used impersonally and it can not be de-
termined whether it belongs to one's ego or not.
In the next period of doctrinal history there is a more
complete development of the doctrine of the soul. We shall
then, consider the main figures after the opening of the
fourth century.
The Early Mediaeval Period
As compared with the previous period, there is a
tendency in this one to prefer the twofold nature of man to
the threefold conception. In the Greek church there were
adherents to the latter view. Didymus of Alexandria also gave
it excellent expression. Others, however, rejected the three-
fold nature of man, viz, Athanasius and Theodoret, Cyril of
Jerusalem, Basil, Gregory the Great, and Augustine. The main
38 Sheldon, System of Christian Doctrine, p. 283
•
39 Origen, De Orat
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tendency of the age was that of regarding the soul as incor-
poreal, and the soul’s natural immortality was universally
accepted. 40
The decisive issue arrived at for the church as regards
the incorporeality of the soul as over against the materialis-
tic view of Tertullian and his followers of the earlier period,
grew out of three main arguments. One grew out of the in-
creasing refinement in the conception of God, another grew
out of the analysis of the human mind, and the third was that
the immaterial conception of the soul furnished a better basis
41for the belief in immortality.
Augustine was the outstanding figure of this period, and
he very definitely contends for the incorporeality of the soul.
Man, to him, was the union of the body and the soul, the soul
being a simple immaterial or spiritual substance, distinct
from the essence of the body, but the life power of the body.4'2
The soul, to him,
"is not an emanation from God; each man has his
his own individual soul. Nor did souls exist
before their union with bodies (pre-existence).
How they arose, Augustine leaves unsettled; it
is a problem he is unable to solve. He finds it
hard to decide in favor of any of the views common
in his day: that God creates a new soul for every
child that is born (creationism) or that souls are
generated from the souls of parents in the same
way, and at the same time, as bodies from bodies
( traducianism)
40 Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrine, pp. 224-225.
41 Knudson, Doctrine of kedemptlon, p. ys.
42 Thilly, A history oT Philosophy, p. 150 •
43 Ibid., p. 151.
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Puzzled by the problem of origin of the soul, Augustine was
orthodox in leaving it an unexplained mystery. In summary of
his position, we can say, that for him
"Man is the highest creature in the visible
world, a union of soul and body. . . . The soul is
a simple, immaterial, or spiritual substance, entirely
distinct in essence from the body; it is the
directing and forming principle, the life of the
body; but how it acts on the body is a mystery." 44
Gregory of Nyssa, while very close to Augustine in his
views, held to the traducian theory. Athanasius adopted the
same view, while Theoderet gave distinct utterance to the
theory of creationism along with Jerome of the Latin church.
Along with these minor disputes, Faustus of Rhegium and certain
others maintained the materialistic view of the soul as did
Tertullian of the preceding period, but the Augustinian views
represent the more progressive thought and most significant
contribution of the period. Taking the standpoint of inner
experience, he largely presupposed the psychology of the
Middle Ages, and allowed for the drift in the next period
47toward creationism.
The Late Mediaeval Period
In the latter part of the mediaeval period there is a
turn to a more intimate relationship between the soul a d the
body. This can be traced to revived Aristotelianism. " "The
twofold division of human nature as opposed to the three fold,
the incorporeal essence of the soul and its natural
immortality were matters of common belief." 4^
ni 1 ly , Op. Cit., p. 150. 45 Sheldon, Op. Cit., p. 224.
46 Lindelband, Op. Cit., pp. 303-304
47 Sheldon, Op. Cit., p. 226. 48 Thilly, Op. Cit., p. 196.
.49—Sheldon, Qp. Cit., p. 546.
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Several names appear during this period, yet Aquinas
and Scotus stand out. John of Damascus, Hugo of St. Victor,
Peter Lombard, Abelard, and Bernard all believed that man was
created in the "image" and in the "likeness" of God though
50
they distinguished between the two. As respects the
theology of the period, the theory of the origin of the soul
that had predominance was creationism.
In Aquinas we find gradations of beings, the
natural souls, the human souls, and angels. The plant souls
and the animal souls, however, have no existence apart from
matter. On the nature of the human soul, we find the following
conception. It was an immaterial, subsistent form. Its
relation to the body was as the entelechy of the body. Thus
the two were not separate but rather intimately and dependently
connected. The soul is intelligent, sensitive, and the really
51
vital principle in man. As to the origin of the soul
Aquinas held to the creationist viewpoint, i.e., God created
the soul of each individual as soon as the body is predisposed
52
and ready to receive it.
The general trend of the thinking of Aquinas toward the
view of the unitary self as a whole being, a living conscious
organism, was picked up by Scotus. For him form and matter
constitute a substantial unity in man. "The soul itself is a
union of form and matter."'^
50 Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrine, p. 342.
51 Thilly, A History of Philosophy, p. 1^6
.
52 Ibid., p. TFr.
53 Thilly, Ibid., p. 211 .
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To such a point of view the fragmentary nature of
consciousness and the various abilities and attentions of the
ordinary individuals existence would present a problem. This
was solved by Scotus by contending that the soul is a unity
having different powers and as such the soul takes care of
the variety of experience. However, the distinctions are
formal and not essential to the nature of the soul. The
essential feature of the idea is that the soul has continuity
consisting in the exercise of different powers.54
With the decline of Scholasticism there arose afresh
the contention between realism and nominalism. It was declared
that the avowed intention of bringing about a union of
philosophy and theology in a system of rationalized religious
beliefs was futile, that scholastic theology was a pseudo-
science, and that the entire realm of the contents of faith
are inaccessible to reason. The Thomistic views were carried
on in Meister Eckhart, the mystic, but during the period the
incorporeality of the soul had remained unchallenged*
The Reformation Period and Modern Philosophy
Out of the controversy between realism and nominalism
we find the progress of free thought preceding the period of
the Reformation. With the new enlightment came a new Platonism,
and a new Aristotelianism, and the scientific movement
ushering in naturalistic philosophy. There was not a great
deal of discussion over the idea of the soul. The twofold
54 Thilly, A History of Philosophy
,
p. 212.
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nature of man seemed to prevail. The soul was, according
to common belief, incorporeal, and in the sixteenth century
creationism was the prevalent doctrine. 56 There were
differing views, however. Gerhard, for instance, wrote,
"We hold tenaciously the theory of the propagation of souls,
"57 And between these two views was that of Henry More
who advocated the doctrine of the soul’s pre-existence. 58
The spirit of the new period was, nevertheless, dynamic, vital,
and progressive.
In this period the outstanding names are Francis Bacon,
Thomas Hobbes, Descartes, Berkeley, Leibnitz, Kant, and Lotze.
Among the English Empiricists Francis Bacon grouped the
relationship of the body and soul under human philosophy. To
him the soul was a divine or rational part and an irrational
part. Its faculties are understanding, reason, imagination,
memory, appetite, will, and all these with which logic and
59
ethics are concerned. Thomas Hobbes, however, would not
agree with the schoolmen that there were any incorporeal
substances or spirits in addition to the body. Descartes, the
last of the substantialists
,
and a Platonist, conceived of the
60
soul as a thinking substance.
55 Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrine, II, p. 108*
56 Ibid., p. loSFT
57 Gerhard, Locus, VIII, sec. 117 •
58 Henry More, Immortal Animae, II, p. 12; Sheldon, Ibid.,
59 Thilly, A History of Philosophy, p. 260.
60 Knudson, Doctrine oT Redemption, p. 99
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Body, according to him, is pure extension of the body
substance, distinct from the mind. Of Descartes Knudson
writes, "For him there was no vital, no nutritive or locomotive
soul. The body was rather an automaton A clear cut
62
dualism of body and soul was established."
This trend of thought aided in the development of the
activistic theory, or conception of the soul, made significant
by Berkeley, Leibnitz, Kant, and Lotze. The three stages
developed under the impetus of the new dynamic and idealistic
interpretations of reality are the soul as the creative
source of materiality; secondly, the emphasis upon the soul as
given in experience; and thirdly, reality interpreted in terms
of self-consciousness. Thus, under the heading of activism we
see the modern view of the unitary self arising.
In the post-Kantian idea of the soul we come to the close
of the historical survey. Fichte, after studying Kant, held
that a conscious self can never be subject to the laws of
objects which are, in their real nature, mere phenomena.
Schelling, closely following Fichte, "demonstrates the
impossibility of Kant’s thing-in-itself
,
and interprets Kant’s
transcendental self, as well as Spinoza’s substance, as absolute
64
self. Schleiermacher rejects the idealism of Fichte, so far
as it attempts to drive all the reality from
61 Thilly, A History of Philosophy
, p. 281.
62 Knudson, Philosophy of Personalism, p. 71 .
63 Calkins, Persistent Problems of Philosophy
, p. 309 .
64 Ibid., p. 331
..
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65
the ego, as sinning a real world. He places high value on
individual personality, and this saved him from sinking the
human soul in the universal substance . Schopenhauer also
67
asserts the reality of the self. Hegel followed Schelling
in that they both contended for the reality of the real.
For Hegel, the mind or spirit (Geist) is productive knowing. 68
<
Hence, by the beginning of the contemporary period theology,
philosophy, and psychology have become scientific in that they
have renounced the conception of the soul-substance, and are
building up laws for the psychical life upon inner and outer
experience, as we shall further see in the next chapter of
the paper.
Summary
From the vague soul-idea of the primitive we have
attempted to follow the historical thought down through the
centuries. The first stage, that of animism, thought the
soul to be invisible, yet of a rarified form of matter.
Substantialistic and activistic theories of a latter day were
here born. The origin-theories of the soul were then consid-
ered, and from that background we began the historical study.
In the consideration of Greek thought pertaining to the
soul, we found little systematic work in the early writers.
Yet in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and the Epicurean and
Stoic thinkers there is definite teaching pertaining to the
65 Thilly, A History of Philosophy, p. 460.
66 Ibid., p. 461.
67 Calkins, Persistent Problems of Philosophy, p. 309
68 Thilly, ibTcT., p. 473":
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soul. In Jewish thought, nephesh , was materialistic, and in
the New Testament pneuma meant much the same, though both
were used to mean the vital principle of life. The early
Christian period revealed a marked distinction between body
and soul with some dispute as to whether it was immaterial or
not. Continual refinement of thought deposited in the early
Mediaeval period, belief that the soul was incorporeal, immor-
tal, and man had a twofold nature. Augustine dominated this
period. Revived Aristotelianism brought further conviction
and light to the thinkers of the late Mediaeval period.
Dichotomy, the incorporeal essence of the soul, and its natural
immortality were now common beliefs. Aquinas and Scotus
dominated this period. During the Reformation period and that
of modern philosophy varying views prevailed in regards to
the soul. The substantialistic and activistic theories
developed with Descartes the last of the substantialists
.
Prom primitive animism we go through the intellectual
toil of the ages and come back to a new animism, an intellect-
ually justified soul-view in the light of modern thought.
While Tennant rejects the ancient view of the soul, he accepts
a newer view of it along with many others. Some psychologies
make little room for even that, so to consider these varying
views in relation to Tennant's view will be the problem of
the next chapter.
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II. CONTEMPORARY VIEWS OF THE SOUL
From the historical survey of the soul we see that there
have been constantly changing ideas of it. Thus when we come
to the study of Tennant* s idea of the soul we find that his
idea is but one of the many current notions of the day. It
shall be the purpose of this chapter to investigate the several
psychological and philosophical ideas of the soul at the
present time with the view of arriving at a better understanding
of Tennant's view and position in world thought.
Psychologically there are notions of the soul and also
denials of the existence of the soul. Behaviorism offers an
interesting study of a psychological school of thought that
rejects the notion of a soul. It relegates the soul to the
dim ages of antiquity, a mere fiction that has been handed
down from prescientific days. Edna Heidbreder says of
Behaviorism, "It sees the whole oo ncept of consciousness as
useless and vicious, as nothing but the survival of mediaeval
superstition about the soul, and as utterly unworthy of
scientific consideration. The heart of the idea of this
school is that all experience is determined by the conditioning
of reflexes, and beyond this there is no originality. A
man's motor behavior is to be taken as the sole activity of
the whole individual. Sensation, perception, memory, thinking,
emotion, and desire are to be excluded from the picture of man
n
which behaviorism presents. The picture of man is much like
1 Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies
,
p. 234.
5 Woodworth. Contemporary Systems of Psychology, p. 68,
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that presented by Karl Capek in his play R.U.R., or in the
clever satire of Huxley in his book of several years ago.
Brave New World . Man is here nothing more than an automaton,
and the idea of the soul is blown out of the intellectual
laboratory by this supposed refreshing breeze of integrated
stimulus-response behavior. Watson writes that "In behaviorism
you find none of these grand old speculative bugaboos about
which so many millions of pages have been so fruitlessly
written."
3
If these human experiences are to be regarded as
valid, one must be empirical and declare behaviorism inadequate.
With his usual clear insight Tennant says that "Psychology
without a soul is but psychology that ignores the soul which
it everywhere presupposes in order to get itself propounded.
King in his book Behaviorism
,
A Battle Line
,
declares that
the fashion of describing the soul may change, but its reality
will remain.
We turn then from behaviorism to Gestalt psychology
to find an altogether different view of the soul. Instead of
the soul being regarded as an illusion of the highest order,
it is made a fundamental principle. This school arose in
Germany as a conscious protest against the older experimental
school of Wundt. Max Wertheimer, one of the founders of the
school, was aided by Wolfgang Kohhler and Kurt Koffka. The
3 Watson, Behaviorism
, p. 3 .
4 Tennant, Cf. Sir James Marchant, Ed. The Future of
Christianity
, p.
5 King, Behaviorism, A Battle Line, p. 344
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Gestalt is sometimes thought of as a shape or form and some-
times as a "concrete individual and characteristic entity...."^
In this conception the self or soul may he a Gestalt or
Gestalten
,
for it is in experience that the soul is known. In
attacking the structural idea of experience, the idea is
expressed.
"Gestalten are not rigid structures composed
of rigid units; they show different degrees of
stability. It is this kind of experience which
psychology must explain--not elements juxtaposed
in time and space, but experience in which ’formed*
wholes appear and tend to appear." 7
Formed wholes appear to the self or the soul of the individual
experient. All world patterns go to make up the world and
all may be drawn into the one pattern which is the self. Even
the soul may be a pattern in whole that is made up of lesser
patterns, but in these patterns lies the seat of experience.
In this view that the self may be a Gestalt
,
Gestalt psychology
allows for a psychological view of the soul.
Turning from the two contrasting views of the soul in
behaviorism and Gestalt psychology, let us consider Titchener
and his school commonly known as structuralism. This brilliant
Englishman as a student of Wundt definitely leans toward his
Q
orthodoxy. He says of the self, as a psychological rubric,
it means
"the particular combination of talent, temperament
and character - of intellectual, emotive and active
mental constitution - that makes up an individual
mind. Self, as a conscious experience, is any
6 Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies, p. 332
.
7 Ibid., p. 35T~.
8 Ibid., pp. 113-115.
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complex of mental processes that means some
temporary phase of this combination; and self-
consciousness in which the self, as a conscious
experience, is focal." y
This notion of the self Titchener held to be only an occasional
visitor to the author’s experience, yet it is the organic
background of experience. This idea of the self, or soul,
Titchener also makes personal, writing further, "There is,
no doubt, an instinctive tendence to personalization." ^
In functionalism we find a definite and organized stand
against domination by the Titchenerian, or Yfrmdtian school. ^
This school, of which Dewey is a representative alor.g with
James Angell, developed in the University of Chicago, and was
primarily i terested in activities. It was not so much in-
terested in content as it was in operations. These operations
are functions. The functional process of activity is then of
paramount importance. This school finds no use for the term
soul, though it "treats the mind dynamically
,
as continuously
active and never fixed, or as a stream of constantly changing
processes." ^ John Dewey says of the soul or self, in true
functional terms, "There is no one ready-made self behind
activities. There are complex, unstable, opposing attitudes,
habits, impulses which gradually come to terms with one another,
and assume a certain consistency of configuration, even though
only by means of a distribution of inconsistencies which keeps
9 Titchener, A Textbook of Psychology, p. 544.
10 Ibid., p. 525“
11 Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies, p. 201.
12 Moore, Foundations of Psychology, p. 24.
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them in water-tight co partments, giving them separate turns or
13
tricks in action.” Dewey further makes the scathing statement,
when discussing habits formed in process, "A mind or conscious-
ness or soul in general which performs these operations is a
myth."^4 The criticism of functionalism that Tennant would pass
upon it is that it is inadequate. One cannot "'study mental
functions without at the same time studying the functioning
15
self.’” If there must be a thinker who thinks, there must also
be one to whom the functions belong.
In the psychology of William James, we find an inde-
pendent teaching. Edna Heidbreder suggests that he can not
be placed in any well marked school, nor was he definitely
aligned with any psychological development in progress in his
day.^ James turned toward concrete experience for his cues
and his evidence, thus allowing for some type of an integrating
factor which he terms the self. He dismisses, however, with
the notion of the soul, yet clings to the unifying principle
17
of the soul which he calls "the states of consciousness”.
Of the soul, he writes, "It makes no difference in this con-
nection whether this being be called Soul, Ego, or Spirit,
in either case its chief function is that of a combining medium
Hence we see the truth of Tennant’s quoted statement, that
psychology without a soul is psychology that ignores the soul,
13 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 138.
14 Ibid., p. 176“
15 Mary Calkins, Cf. Moore, Op. Cit., p. 69.
16 Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies, p. 152.
17 James, Psychology, p. .
18 Ibid., pTTtfCrr
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yet presupposes the soul in order to get itself propounded.
Turning from the more academic schools of psychology,
we find in Freud a psychoanalytic movement with its roots
in the soil of clinical practice. 19 Beginning his career as
a medical student in Vienna, he later studied under Charcot
in Paris, and ended up as leader of the psychoanalytic movement
Through all this fantastical system is the stream of individual
experience, however, for it is written of his system that
the "ego develops out of the id through the contact of the self
with external reality, and becomes the mediator between the
self and the external world."^ This ego can be called the
soul, and the statement is made that it knows reality.
In these several psychological schools of thought we
see the varying opinions regarding the soul. While the idea
of the soul is used by them in different manners, the soul
itself is for the most part ignored. That is all right in
psychology, perhaps, for the soul or the self is common to
all of experience and is therefore not necessary as a factor
in the interpretation of experience. However, if one is to
understand the whole of reality he must consider, as does
Tennant, the idea of the soul, for it is not content, it is
that which contains, it is the unifying principle of the
experiences
We turn then, to self-psychology
,
as expounded by
19 Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies, p. 376.
20 Ibid., p. 3981
21 Ibid., p. 398
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Professor Brightman, Mary Calkins, and Dean Knudson. Professor
Brightman calls attention to the fact that experience comes
in cluster. A particular conscious fact or experience is
not itself abstracted from its setting. "A state of
consciousness does not continue to exist if separated from
the cluster in which it occurs." 22 Further, "This fact of
experiencing consciousness together in a unique way is called
self -experience . A self (or person) is conscious life thus
experienced."23
Mary Calkins, in writing her textbook for psychology,
prefaces it with the words,
"This book has been written in the ever strength-
conviction that psychology is most naturally,
consistently, and effectively treated as a study
of conscious selves in relation to other selves
and to external objects - in a word, to their
environment, personal and impersonal." 24
These tv/o allow for the existence of the self, and
Professor Brightman distinguishes between the soul and the
self, yet when we come to the psychology of Knudson, we find
that he uses, for all practical purposes, the idea of the soul
and the self interchangeably. Knudson’ s view is the
activistic view, mentioned in the historical survey of the
idea of the soul. He says, "The reality of the soul or the
self or the *1* is the fundamental presupposition of personalism^
it is even a more characteristic doctrine than the existence
of a personal God. 25
22 Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 190.
23 Ibid., p. 1WT.
24 Calkins, A Textbook in Psychology, p. VII.
25 Knudson, Philosophy of Personalism, p. 67.
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This latter view of the soul is the most suitable of
all contemporary viev/s from Tennant* s standpoint. He takes
his psychology from the personalistic psychologist, James
Ward, of whose work he says, when telling students to read
Psychological Principles by Ward,
"I would venture to advise resort to portions
of Ward*s formidable work. Not because I myself
regard it as the greatest single work, of any age,
on the human mind; but on account of several
specific characteristics of its masterliness, that
make it pre-eminently suitable for the purpose now
in view.”26
Tennant further writes, "We must continue to attribute existence,
and not merely being (as something different) to supersensible,
27
and possible timeless, entities, e.g., the soul and God."
In the brief survey of the contemporary ideas of the
soul from the psychological standpoint we thus see Tennant*
s
relationship. In the next chapter we shall discuss specific-
ally his conception of the soul, but here it is well enough
to find only his position. We shall then go from our con-
sideration of contemporary psychological views of the soul to
a discussion of contemporary philosophical views.
In considering the philosophical views of the soul from
the point at which we left them in the first chapter of the
historical development of the idea of the soul, we can first
mention the positivistic view. This view arose with David
Hume, who denied any real existence to the self beyond the
mere stream of consciousness, or states of experience. It
26 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
I, p. VII.
27 Ibid., p. 373.
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was Hume who said that he could never catch himself without
a perception and could never observe anything but a perception.
28
In criticism to this, G. A. Wilson has written,
"Hume*s embarassment was not merely that
he failed to find a metaphysical entity distinct
from the flow of mental states, but that when he
would give an account of the empirical ego, he
found it utterly elusive.” 2®
In the pragmatistic school in America we find a successor
to this positivistic denial of the soul. William James was
one of the leading exponents, but he has been discussed in
his psychological bearing. Dewey and Schiller were also
exponents of this thought to some extent. Dean Knudson passes
the criticism, among others, that pragmatism is positivistic,
has no theory of reality, and tends toward illusionism in
og
religion. At any rate, being practical and functional, it
finds no necessity of the self.
In connection with this empirical thought is the idea
from the French empiricist, Henri Bergson. He, however, finds
self-consciousness within the individual, as he develops from
the evolutionary process. Wilson, in referring to Bergson*
s
book. Creative Evolution
,
says,
"The reality then in the cosmic flow is
an energy or force When it breaks up into
individual manifestations and has to adjust
itself to the assumed entity called matter, it
may rise to an awareness of itself; it may become
self-conscious . "30
28 Wilson, The Self and Its World
, p. 283.
29 Knudson, Lecture, "Philosophical Foundations of Religious-
Belief"
.
30 Wilson, The Self and Its World, p. 286f
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In the realistic view of the soul we find that the old
notion is substituted by the idea of a self that is logically
and essentially independent of the existence of other selves
so that they could vanish and it in itself could remain
unaltered. Of Leibnitz's monads, Royce says,
"Leibnitz's monads are realistic selves;
and very frequently the extremer forms of ethical
individualism, in order to preserve the dignity
or the freedom or the rights of the self, have
chosen to use a realistic formulation. When thus
defined by the more ethical types of individualistic
Realism, the self seems to stand, within its own
realm, as a sort of absolute authority, over
against any external will or knowledge that pretends
to determine its nature, or its precise limits,
or its meaning. It is merely what its own
substantial nature determines it to be. It is
thus a separate entity, in its essence un-
approachable, in some sense, by God or man,
unconquerable, possessing perhaps its own inalien-
able rights, the unit of all ethical order, the
center of its own universe. "31
In this study of Tennant's idea of the soul related to his
doctrine of the Personality of God, it is seen that this
realistic view has little bearing, for the soul here has no
possibility of knowledge or relation with other selves or
souls, a concept definitely opposed to Tennant's idea of
relatedness
.
In the mystical view of the soul, we find a denial of
its independent existence apart from God. Many mystics have
as their goal complete absorption of their soul by God, as
Labadie, the French Pietist wrote, in his last testament
praying to God, "that He will take me unto himself and engulf
31 Royce, The World and the Individual, II, p. 282 f
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me eternally in the divine abyss of his Being.”32 All mystics
do not agree, yet Royce writes of their conception of the self,
"The self is the Absolute, the Absolute
is simple, and there is neither variety of in-
dividuals, nor form nor law of life left. The
only word as to the true self is the Hindoo*
s
Neti Neti. Consequently mysticism simply condemns
a11'""finite individuality as an evil dream." 33
Despite Tennant* s position of the relatedness between man
and God, he does not go to this extreme of fusion, but
maintains an independent relatedness.
From this school of thought, we go to modern critical
rationalism to find its view of the self. Royce writes of it,
"For critical Rationalism the self is no
independent entity, nor any mere experience, but
a being whose reality involves the validity of a
system of laws and relationships. These laws may
be viewed in their psychological aspect. In this
sense my Self extends as far as my possible
memories, or expectations, or definable plans
hold valid for the empirical region called my
human life. "34
The soul or the existent self is possible only within the
systems of laws to which the human is bound.
From these varied views of the self or the soul, let
us turn to the view more nearly expressive of Tennant*
s
position, i.e., to the idealistic view of the soul. In this
concept we find a self that is individual, conscious, and
active, something that is abiding. The soul is not, however,
a "thing" from this point of view, as Royce suggests, it is
rather a "meaning embodied in conscious life. Its individuality
32 Pringle-Pattison,The Idea of Immortality
, pp. 161-162.
33 Royce, The World and the Individual, II, p. 234.
34 Royce, p. 28'4f
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in case of any human being implies the essential uniqueness
of life." 3^ The universe is more than an existent, it is
meaning and purpose, and the self is the interpreter of this
meaning. Ideal selfhood progresses toward the ideal of the
universe.
In the personalis tic school of thought, of which Borden
Parker Bowne is the "father”, we find a supreme place of
importance given to the idea of the self or soul. Bowne
rejects the substantialistic view and the absolutist point
of view. He regards personality as the key to reality, and
writes of the soul,
”In all articulate experience the self
appears as the abiding subject, the same
yesterday and today. The experience is owned;
and the owning self which thinks and feels and
wills we call the soul. "36
A former student of Bowne* s, who occupies his chair.
Professor Brightman, says of the self that it is organic,
mental, monadic, and active. And he further writes,
"A self, then, is any conscious experience
or process taken as a whole and as experiencing
itself. The ’soul’ was the hypostatization of
this ’wholeness'
;
but since the self is a concrete
conscious reality, why push the soul off into the
realm of the unknowable? ”37
Dean Knudson, in expounding his philosophy of
Personalism holds that the self or the soul is absolutely
essential. Reference was made to that in connection with
35 Royce, The World and the Individual
,
II, p. 269.
36 Bowne, Metaphysics
, pp. 299-300.
37 Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 191.
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58
with contemporary psychological views of the soul. His
view is the activistic, or the new animism, and he writes,
"The spirit asserts its reality in and
through its activity. And this activity must
manifest itself in the realm of thought, if the
independence of spirit is to have any meaning.
For it is thinking .that constitutes the essence
of the soul, and it is only insofar as thought is
active and creative that it oecomes a constitu-
tive factor in the world. The ultimate
theoretical basis for the reality of the self is,
therefore, to be found in the creative or
constitutive character of its thought-activity."^
Further he says,
"The idea of a soul substance was rejected
as unknowable, and in its place was put a mental
agent, a being whose very existence is constituted
by its self-consciousness and its self-direction.
It is this conception of the soul that represents
the latest and the most highly developed form of
animism.
While Tennant may differ in sane specific details from
the above conception of the soul, his idea is of the idealistic
type. He says in a footnote, in his philosophical works,
"The pure ego must be in the me; it is
the sole subject. It is ’pure’ only in the sense
of having fewer empirical qualities. We need
not cling to the name 'pure ego'; all that is
here meant by it is the abiding subject, to
which the name 'soul' can be given. "41
The soul for Tennant is the key to the personality of man.
Summary
Thus far in the study of Tennant's idea of the soul
related to his doctrine of the personality of God, we have
38 See p . 30 .
39 Knudson, Philosophy of Pers onalism
, p. 137.
40 Knudson, Doctrine of Redemption
,
p. 100 •
41 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
I, p. 79.
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traced the historical development of the idea of the soul.
It has been the purpose of this chapter to investigate the
contemporary views of the soul with the purpose of arriving
at a better understanding of Tennant* s position. In the field
of psychology we found the behavioristic school to deny the
idea of the soul. Gestalt psychology, however, made room for
the notion of a soul in experience. Titchener, in his
structuralism, allowed a self that in conscious experience
"is focal M . In functionalism of John Dewey’s type, we found
no mention of the soul, but support of the idea of the self
that is a "connecting, relating activity, and hence is a
real unity...." In the independent teaching of William James,
we found the soul to be the combining medium of the experiences
In terms of the ego, Freud, also expresses the idea of the
soul, though not specifically stating it. In the school of
self-psychology
,
we found the position that the soul is
fundamental in the conception of man. Thus from the denial
of the soul up through the affirmation of it, we see the
background of Tennant’s psychological position, and can say
with John Laird, "If anything has a right to be called a
distinct particular thing, the soul has such a right pre-
eminently."^
From a philosophical viewpoint, we also see conflicting
notions of the soul, from the positivistic denial to the
idealistic affirmation of it as a fundamental principle.
42 Laird, Problems of the Self, pp. 262-263.
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The empirical school gave little thought to the idea of the
soul. The realistic and the mystical views of the soul were
found rather barren from Tennant* s viewpoint, as was the
school of critical rationalism. In the idealistic school of
thought, and especially in personalism as represented by
Bowne, Knudson, and Brightman, v/e find the most adequate view
of the soul, and the one with which Tennant associates himself.
We thus see that Tennant, in firmly believing in the
existence of the soul, has a long line of predecessors, and
many contemporary thinkers who agree with him. Among all of
the conflicting psychological theories, Tennant's is one of
the strongest. Also in the field of philosophical thought
as in the historic development of theological thought, Tennant
has many strong predecessors, and allies among his contem-
poraries. Prom this historic and contemporary background we
shall turn to the specific discussion of Tennant's own view
of the soul.
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III. TENNANT *3 IDEA OF THE SOUL
Sufficient account of the historical development of
the idea of the soul and the present day views have now been
given, to prepare the way for the specific study of Tennant*
s
idea of the soul. Tennant, in his work Philosophical Theology ,
lays the groundwork for his discussion primarily upon the
psychological cognitive process. Hence, one sees his relation
to the historical stream of thought and to present day
theories. We can later conclude our internal criticism by
relating his idea of the soul to his doctrine of the personality
of God.
In discussing the idea of the soul, Tennant first states
that before there can be any knowledge of other selves or
egos or souls, "There must obviously be in individual
experience some rudimentary notion of one's self."! How
self-consciousness is gained from a subject originally only
conscious is, then, the first consideration.
Here Tennant utilizes genetic psychology to show that
the transition is mediated by differentiation of the body
from other precepts. As an example he tells of a sick
individual who regards his body as a strange and inimical thing,
not belonging to him. Through the body, then, we localize
organic sensa and realize that the body is "me"
,
a unique
posession. From this level one goes to the ideational level
1 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, p. 70.
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of individual experience where "further development of self-
consciousness becomes possible."
2
One discerns change within
the bodily self; ideas compete for attention with precepts;
3
and the idea of the soul germinates inside us
.
From the attainment of the self-consciousness, Tennant
says the experient can advance to a belief in other selves.
And this belief, he holds, is mediated through their bodily
behavior as in the first instance self-consciousness is
mediated first by differentiation of the body from other pre-
cepts. He writes,
"If knowledge of other selves be originally
reached thus, it was attained not by a method com-
parable to that of establishing uniform sequences,
but teleologically: its later self-evidence has
been acquired pragmatically ."4
This self must be very rudimentary. Tennant then calls
to mind some objections from those who maintain that other
peoples’ mental states or mental processes are directly
apprehended, like sense-data. This view is generally held in
the abstract. He writes,
"To argue that, though it is intrinsically
impossible that one subject can have, or erleben,
another's states, there is no absurdity in alleging
that he can immediately apprehend them as parts of
his acquaintance-environment ."5
But the question as Tennant sees it is not as to possibility
or conceivability in abstraction from circumstance, but as
a matter of fact. We can not verify by fact evidence that
2 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, p. 71.
3 Ibid., p. 71.
4 Ibid., p. 72.
5 Ibid., p. 73.
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one can know another* s mind, know his emotions, and know what
he is experiencing in the dark for instance, with the un-
failing correctness that immediate apprehension v/ould render.
Here Tennant uses the word 'immediate* without discrimination
of its 'psychic' and 'psychological' senses. Mind reading
has been done by some, yet, concludes Tennant,
"As to normal knowledge of the existence and
operations of other minds, the facts leave no room
for any view but that it is almost wholly, if not
wholly, the outcome of analogical ejection, pragma-
tically justified so amply as to hav§ become an
inevitable and self-evident belief."®
After making the statements how one becomes self-
conscious and how he comes to a belief in other selves, Tennant
proceeds to consider the development of self-knowledge,
rendered possible by communication with other selves. At
the perceptual level things v/ere "comprehended and understood
by projecting into their elements characteristics of the
self At the intellectual level this egocentric
procedure is reversed. As one becomes a social individual he
acquires knowledge of himself by observing, immitating, and
understanding other selves. As Tennant puts it, "He examines
his conduct in the light of the behavior of others, and so
acquires conscience: he becomes, as it were, an external
spectator of himself."® The thinking, willing, moralized
person then regards the apetitive self as an outer self
possessed, like property, by an inner self. This inner self
6 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, p. 73, I.
7 Ibid., p
“
8 Ibid., p. 74-75.
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is no longer thought of as inside the body, "but as
metaphorically interior to unextended objects presented to,
and so distinct from, itself.” 9 We thus have the psychologist’s
notion of the perduring subject as pure ego, with the added
refinement of the thinking willing self. If this process of
the knowledge of the self is true, the self is the last to
be reached in the process of knowing. If, on the other hand,
the idea be more than fiction, "if it have a counterpart in
Actuality, it is in logical order the first, because
presupposed in all knowing." 10
A new issue then comes up, the question of whether to
the pure ego there is a corresponding Actuality. Tennant
says that
"psychologically, the I knowing, and the pure ego as
known, are distinguishable; and logically, they
are two terms, not one, viz., recipient and datum.
Ontologically, they may be numerically one entity
with two aspects, one substance with two roles. "J- 1
How the pure ego is known must be first considered. One view
is that the subject apprehends itself with the immediacy of
acquaintance. Yet Tennant adds " though awareness of
objects cannot be had without acquaintance - for these are
one and the same thing - knowledge about objects, to which
class the I belongs, can so be had n1^ And he points
out two errors involved in the negation of the possibility of
indirect knowledge of the ego. They are: It applies
9
Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, p. 75.
10 Ibid., p.^751
11 Ibid., p. 76.
12 Ibid., p. 76.
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to conceptual objects, which is only true of impressional
objects; and it applies to acquaintance with objects, which
13
is only true of knowledge about objects. Tennant goes
further to say that the theory of direct acquaintance with the
"I” is equally unconvincing, and concludes that
"We are thus empirically confined to the
alternative view, that the pure ego, if known
at all and not merely thought or supposed, is
but known about, mediately and reflectively or
intellectively . "14
His argument is this.
"Consciousness involves a subject; there
is awareness of consciousness; therefore, as
cognition does not create its primary objects,
there is knowledge of the involved subject's
existence ."15
This means that on the consciousness level, consciousness
is presented to the self as any sensum and this involves a
subject. We can know that we are. Finally, Tennant says that
another consequence of this doctrine is that cognition of the
;
16
subject is no«menal and not phenomenal.
"The I that is unknowable to sense, is
knowable to intellect operating on sense, though
not to intellect operating independently of sense;
and this intelligible knowledge of the I is not,
like perception of the non-ego, dependent on
immediate presentation of the object (in this case
the I) itself." 17
Thus far in the discussion of the idea of the soul it
is evident that only facts have been used and not baseless
13" Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, p. 77.
14 Ibid., p. 77.
15 Ibid., p. 77.
16 Ibid., p. 78.
17 Ibid., p. 78.
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speculation independent of empirical data. Tennant prides
himself throughout his work on this method. There are foes
to this idea of the pure ego, however, and they demure on
the two main grounds that the idea of the pure ego transcends
the facts, and that it is a superfluity with which psychology
can dispense. 18 Tennant, however, follows his process through,
reminding us that the empirical method is the only one adequate.
Further ideas which lead to an attack upon the belief
in a soul are met by Tennant. He substitutes the idea of
temporal continuity for the psychological serial theory of
"instants", and the idea of unity of mental life for a serial
concept. Also he substitutes the idea that the ego is an
Actuality for the theory that it is a logical construction.
Then we can next consider in Tennant* s idea of the soul
the necessity of temporal continuity. He immediately dismisses
the attempt to describe psychological facts in terms of the
"instant", for he says, "An experience confined to a present
instant, is a contraduction of terms." 19 He does not admit
the empirical self as a series of momentary subjects. Each
momentary present overlaps another. One anticipates the
future, is conscious of the present, and has a memory image
of the past. He writes,
"It is sheer falsification if taken for more
than approximate method; if the unceasing flux of
mental life is lost sight of; or if phases are
treated merely as happenings, and without reference
18 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, p. 79.
19 Ibid., p.-SZ;
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to their functions and psychological interde-
pendence. We then but exchange facts for fictions.
The specious present is the only experiential or
actual unit, so far as temporal aspect is con-
cerned, that psychology can find; and it, we see,
affords no basis for the theory that the personal
ftfos is discontinuous."20
The fact of retention reveals the indispensableness
of the continuing subject. Many of one's mental states are
derived from other mental states and the bond of connection
would be the common subject, the soul of the individual self.
Tennant states that "unless the same subject that formerly
perceived, afterwards recalls, there can be no momentary
„9l
reminiscence, let alone a life-long memory-store . As for
the continuity of attention, Tennant explains that the subject
may be aware of both the old and the new, and of the transi-
tion from the one to the other. "The end of the one process,
and the beginning of the other, are contemporaneous."22
In this argument for the continuous ego or soul,
Tennant meets squarely certain objections. It is suggested
that one account for the mental continuity can be a series of
separate psychosis that is aware of itself as a series. The
self-conscious is mediated by apprehension of relations
between objects, says Tennant, and it would be impossible to
know the future that must be in the series. Another view of
one’s mental unity is that it consists "in relation between
successive items, as phenomena to one another in turn." 2^
20 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, pp. 83-84.
21 Ibid., ppT 'B4-8b.~
22 Ibid., p. 85.
23 Ibid., p. 87.
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This would not account for the abiding soul, and without
appealing to that it is "no easier to unify two momentary
experiences than a life-time of them." Actual experience
is explained only on the basis of the permanent ego. Hume
initiated skepticism as to the abiding subject, but he did
not offer a better substitute. He said that he could not find
the I among his impressions, but he neglected to see that he
could not experience an impression, rather he had to experience
his impression. In his series theory, like any other, there
or
must be the continuous ego.
In the unity of the mental life of the individual one
finds the serial theory falling short in explanation as it
did in the temporal continuity. Two or more people may share
in the same experience, yet the experience is individual to
each experient. They are both affected by the same object,
but that is all H ... .neither * s emotion, as a mental occurrence,
is erlebt by the other.*'26 If the serial theory is taken
seriously, it will have to bridge the gap, and if not, says
Tennant, it falls into presentationism. And this in turn
collapses when confronted with individuality. Presentationism
can
” offer no reason why presentations should
arrange themselves in particular streams, such
as yours and mine, or why so much of individual
experience should be, as it is, incommunicable.
On the theory of an -abiding ego, on the other hand,
the individuality, like the unity and continuity
24 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, p. 87.
25 Ibid., p.“5^
26 Ibid., p. 90.
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of a mind, follows as a matter of course
.
To find an adequate conception of the soul, one must agree
with Tennant here that it is discovered only on the personal
basis that includes the unity and the continuity.
In building up a concept of the soul, Tennant dispenses
with another attack upon the ego-concept. That attack is
that the purposes for which the idea was fashioned, "can
equally well be served if the ego be taken to be not an
Actuality but a logical construction, a non-existent subsistent,
a class; and if for actual rapport we substitute logical
relation." 28 Psychology requires an Actuality and an agent
"on which to bestow the name ’ego*." If the ego were only a
class name and not the Actual there would be no permanent
subject to maintain the essential characteristics of the
mind. There would be no mental life, writes Tennant, of unity.
From the above discussion unity is essential in the life of
an individual.
Tennant states that Kant viewed the "I think" as merely
a logical form, but here comes to his defense in saying that
Kant was arguing against the ego, only as known in an a priori
way. He then quotes Kant in his pronouncements on the soul,
in this significant passage:
"One may therefore say of the thinking I
(soul), which represents itself as substance,
simple, numerically identical in all time, and as
27 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, p. 90
28 Ibid., p.-ST:
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the correlative of all existence, from which in
fact all other existence must he concluded, that
it does not know itself through the categories,
bu
t '
"knows the categories only, and through them
all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception,
that is, through itself."29
All this means from Tennant* s viewpoint that the world is
interpreted intelligently only in terms of the human ego at
the level of self-consciousness, known not phenomenally, but
noumenally. All knowledge is mediated through categories that
emanate from us. The soul is then Actual and not a logical
construct, and we know ourselves as abiding subjects. Only
on the basis of "the Actuality of the perduring subject of
personal experience" does Tennant believe the self and God
can be grounded. 3^
In view of Tennant* s establishment of the actuality of the
soul, let us discuss some of its characteristics. These
characteristics are of paramount importance if we are to
relate his idea of the soul to his doctrine of the personality
of God. But having come to the Actuality of the soul we have
finally come to the recognition of its existence. The Actual
acts, and activity determines the Real. Though Tennant uses
the self and the ego and the soul interchangeably, he makes
a fine enough distinction to suggest that the soul is not the
self or the person, "but the Actuality without which there
could be no such thing as a person." 51 The idea of the soul
29 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, p. 93.
30 Ibid., p.-gn
31 Ibid., p. 95.
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is not empty, it is not wholly unknowable, and hence it does
have a character distinctively its own.
In the discussion of the character of the soul by
Tennant it is seen that he makes several definite assertions.
The soul in the first place is simple, not a complexity
of subjects. In this numerically singular aspect of the soul,
Tennant is consistent with his personalistic psychology, for
only on the personal plane can the soul be individual, atomic
or monadic. He clearly distinguishes here between the
simplicity of the soul and its different states or even its
objects. They may be complex yet the soul is simple. "One
subject cannot be divided into two, nor two fused into one." 32
Secondly, as to the essence of the soul, it is individual.
" it alone can have or enjoy its states,
or be presented with its objects - which are its
idea. If such terms as ’fluidity’, ’confluence’,
’overlapping’ , ' interpenetration’
,
have any
scientific, as distinct from poetical, signi-
ficance when applied to personalities, they are
certainly not predicable of pure subjects or souls.
It is sometimes thought that one can sympathetically think
himself into another’s experience. That may be true, but he
does not have that experience, he imaginatively reconstructs
it. Tennant maintains that each soul or self has its own
world, each soul has its own correlation different from any
other. In this manner he is able to say that the ego is an
impenetrable or impervious monad with its own ’point of view’.
32 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, p. 95.
33 Ibid., p. 95.
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However, each soul may have active rapport with objects, and
its experience is explicable as a series of immanent states.
Third, Tennant holds that the soul is individual in a third
sense, that of possessing idiosyncrasy. 54 He here differs
from the mass-point or the electron as conceived by the
physicist. There is a difference between individuals despite
the fact there is a general type. For Tennant, the individual
differences "between persons, of which we are wont to say
there are no two alike, are conditioned in many ways; but the
original feelings of pleasure and displeasure evoked by the
sensa, whether external or somatic, of an individual, must
be what they are, because the pure ego is what it is." 55
On the personal plane, this idiosyncrasy of the individual
soul is tennable. In the fourth consideration of the essence
of the soul, Tennant holds that it is not a "blankly receptive
tabula rasa
,
nor is it exclusively cognitive." 55 It must
then, in nature, be something between and something of both.
In the capacity of feeling, it is interested. The attending
to, deriving ideas, "selectively fashioning concepts and
performing all the synthetic activities involved in the
complexity of mental life constitutes the knowable essence, or
the ’what’, of the pure ego, and account for the richness of
personality which accrues from increasing commerce with ever-
widening environment." 5,7 Tennant is not too clear in
5A Tennant
,
Phi lo sophical Theology, I, p 96.
35 Ibid., p. 96»
36 Ibid., p. 96.
37 Ibid., p. 96.
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discussing this aspect of the essence of the soul, for he
does not make a positive statement as to what the soul is if
it is not a blankly receptive tabula rasa or exclusively
47
cognitive, other than to say that the soul, in the capacity
of feeling, is interested. Fifth, the soul then, is from
Tennant* s point of view, not an existence without an essence
any more than it is essence without existence. This essence
is to function, though its being may not be exhausted in
functioning. Tennant considers the soul to be functioning
even during sleep, or in the mystic who loses himself. Sixth,
in the final consideration of the essence of the soul, it
is to be known noumenally and not phenomenally. Tennant says
of the soul in this respect,
"It is that to which phenomena appear,
and is known otherwise than is the phenomenal.
It is rather the one known being that must be
called ontal or noumenal, if we are to avoid
indefinite regress; or the one ontal thing that
is assuredly known." 3 *3
Tennant here follows the distinction Bowne made in regards
to metaphysical and phenomenal reality. The phenomenal world
is the stimuli for the noumenal self or soul, and one of the
means through which the soul comes to self-realization of
self-consciousness
.
After such a discussion of the essence of the soul as
conceived by Tennant, let us pass to the metaphysical question
of substantiality. Here Tennant first dismisses the concept
of substance as
"that which per se stat or per se concipitur
38 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
p. 97.
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as the self-subsistent and underived; as the
indestructible as well as the indiscerptible;
as static or changeless( the essence of
substantiality before Leibniz); for continuity
of becoming may be the law of the soul* s being.
The soul may not be substantial in any of these
senses, and yet may be called a substantial
Actuality; not substance but a substance.’,39
In this sense Tennant holds that the soul is a substance, for
he means by it that the soul is substantival, i.e., a logical
substance, it is relatively permanent, and that it is active
or efficient. Substance in this sense, is not an abstraction
from concrete individual things and causality, but it is a
"real" category. 40
In the first consideration of the soul as substance,
Tennant makes the point that it is necessary to distinguish
in all thought between the substantive and the adjective,
the characterised and the characterising. In thinking of the
soul, then, in this light, he says it is the particular, the
characterised, not the characterising. The soul cannot be
an adjective of God or even of another soul. The common
fallacy at this point has been to think of the soul as an
aggregate of experiences, or of functions. Also Tennant points
out that the soul has been thought to denote unifiedness of
the experiences, when in actuality the soul is not the mental
life, but is manifested therein. This leads to the second
point of the substantiality of the soul.
39 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
I, p. 97.
40 Ibid., pp. 97-98.
41 Ibid., p. 98.
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The soul is a continuant. 42 In this respect the soul
is however, not a collection of states from Tennant's view-
point. It is not a collection of occurrences, it is not a
class of members. This unification of states or occurrences
or members into one thing "can only be explained in terms
of immanent causation within a numerically singular entity. "43
The soul is then substantially continuant on the personal
plane
.
In the third meaning of substance as attributed to the
soul by Tennant, one finds him using the category of substance
and cause as one and the same thing, i.e., they are at bottom
one, each implicating the other. 44 'while some who exploit
science by eliminating these two categories in explicit usage,
Tennant holds strongly to them. In the abiding ego, Tennant
sees "a substance or continuant to whose immanent causation
or activity, evoked in rapport with objects, is to be referred
the connexion between passing states, constituting them one
Bios." 4^ In terms of this immanent causation and substan-
tiality the continuity of the soul or the continuing identity
is not adjectival changelessness, "but numerical identity of
ground". This substance ground idea of the soul is the only
sufficient ground for unity, coherence, and determination
which psychoses observably manifest. For Tennant, the substance
concept denotes no logical or abstract form. For him, the
42 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, p. 98.
43 Ibid., p. 98
.
44 Ibid., pp. 98-99.
45 Ibid., p. 99.
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soul as an existent "can feel and be efficient with power on
its own act and on the world." 46
Tennant has, ascribed individuality as an essential
characteristic of the soul. He defends this in the face of
such popular terms or expressions as "the mind of the nation",
or the "soul of a people". He feels that the individuality
of the soul is threatened by such phrases. As a figurative
expression they are to be accepted, but in actuality there
can be no such thing from the personalistic viewpoint. The
nation has a collection of individual souls and not a single
soul. Society in this respect may be personal, but it is
not a person. The social mind, then, is a hypostatised
abstraction consequent on previous abstraction of the individual
who is actually a social individual from his social environment.
To be sure, Tennant believes that individual thought and
action is greatly affected by fellowship. Nevertheless
thinking involves a thinker, and a soul involves an individual.
There is no such thing as over-soul. Souls do not coalesce
into them.
While Tennant thus gives a splendid discussion of the
idea of the soul he does say that though we do claim knowledge
of the soul, such knowledge is scant. Psychology can tell us
nothing of the origin or the destiny of the soul, or how it
became embodied. 4^ Opinions then, if they are to command
46 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
I, p. 101.
47 Ibid., p. 102.
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respect, must be consistent with psychological science, and
must be based upon conclusions derived from comprehensive
48
survey of a great field of fact. This Tennant has done very
well in evolving his conceptions.
He succinctly expresses his views on traducianism,
creationism, and pre-existence. As for the theory of traducian-
ism, i.e., the reproduction of souls from souls, Tennant holds
49
it "to involve a quasi-materialistic notion of the spirit,"
This view is inconsistent with knowledge inferred from
psychological fact. This view also transcends observable fact.
The soul-plasm can not be understood from observable fact to
be analogous to germ-plasm. Traducianism also fails to account
for individual peculiarities. Tennant holds also that
creationism transcends fact. Pre-existence he also rejects
as a scientific theory grounded on observable fact. Thus he
concludes that
—
"On any theory, the questions how the
soul becomes associated with the body of this
life between conception and death, and what
occasions y<,rc.u- e t%t are beyond the tether
of fact-controlled speculation.
Tennat does not discuss the immortality of the soul,
though he has argued for its existence and certain
characteristics. In the light of his best philosophical and
psychological knowledge, Tennant says of the soul that it
exists, hence is a part of the Absolute, it has freedom within
the human limitations, it has consciousness, and is mora};
48 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
I, p. 102.
49 Ibid., p. 103. 50 Ibid., p. 103.
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it is simple, individual, and more than that a "blankly
receptive tabula rasa " . From this discussion of the soul as
the basis of human personality, one may proceed to a
consideration of Tennant's conception of the personality of God.
,
53
XV. TENNANT* S DOCTRINE OF THE PERSONALITY OF GOD
In this study of the relationship of Tennant’s idea of
the soul to his doctrine of the personality of God it is seen
that the basis of the relationship is the personal plane.
Within the individual there was found to be a rudimentary
notion of one's self, and this in terms of the soul was self-
knowledge. The soul was found to have continuity as one of
its essential characteristics; it is simple, individual and
concrete, and is known noumenally. Tennant at times seems
to use the terms soul, self, and ego interchangeably
,
ye t in
the actual presentation of his Philosophical Theology he
seems to come to the finer distinction of establishing the
soul as the seat of personality. The soul is the source of
idiosnycrasy within the individual, but the personality is
determined, according to him, by the soul, the sum of
inherited endowments, and the factor thrust upon us by social
nurture and physical environment, with or without volitional
appropriation .
^
After making these finer distinctions,
Tennant concludes his philosophical work with the thought that
the soul is man, the self, the experient, and has a personality?
It is a bit confusing at times, but clear if thought in the
personal terms of which Tennant speaks. Thus in dealing with
the personality of God from Tennant’s standpoint, it will be
our task to consider on the personal plane his empirical
1 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
I, p. 105.
2 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
, II, p. 25S-
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approach to theism then establishing the existence of God, then
his idea of the absoluteness of God, the freedom of God,
divine consciousness, and the moral character of God.
Personality, for Tennant, is a matter of degree, and
he writes there may be all stages of it between man and God .*5
Personality is the highest interpretative concept in the view
of this outstanding personalist, and for the theist, it is the
key to universe. This is close to Bowne* s first statement
that personality is the key to reality. This interpretation
of God may be considered by some as anthropomorphic, but
Tennant comes to the defense of such a challenge in stating
that all human thought is cast in the mold of his own
personality concept; "because man, after all, is man, and must
think as man, if he is to understand - i.e., to assimilate
to himself ." 4
In true empirical style Tennant attempts to divorce
himself from the traditional or classical proofs of the being
of God. He does not try to prove that there is a counterpart
to the preconceived idea of God, nor does he try to prove the
existence of God in a speculative way aloof from religious
experience. Thus in constructing his doctrine of the
personality of God it v/ill be well to follow through with him
the empirical approach to theism. He merely asks how the
world, inclusive of man, is to be explained, without the
3 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
I, p. 125
4 Ibid., p. 127.
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presupposition of the Supreme Being. After this is done we
can arrive with Tennant to the statement, that "The attributes
to be ascribed to God will be such as empirical facts and
their sufficient explanation indicate or require." 5
His first argument for the existence of God is based
on the adaptation of thought to thing, the epistemological
argument. This is rendered possible by the correspondence
betv/een human thought and the external world. From Tennant* s
teleological viewpoint--
"Nature evokes thought of richer kind than
is involved in scientific knowledge, and responds
to thinking such as is neither logically necessary
nor biologically needful, thus suggesting a Beyond."
6
Here the relation between thought and thing achieves its
greatest significance.
In the second place, Tennant discusses the existence of
God from the adaptiveness in organisms. He suggests that the
science of evolution was the primary source for the widening
of the teleological argument in the last century, and it was
also the cause of the recovery of the closely connected
doctrine of divine immanence.^ Tennant also draws attention
to the fact that inorganic nature adapts itself, and there is
continuity of apparent purposiveness between the two realms of
the organic and the inorganic. 8
Tennant does not agree to the full extent that some do
5 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, II, p. 78.
6 Ibid., p. 83.
7 Ibid., p. 84.
8 Ibid., p. 86.
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in attributing the idea of God from the aesthetic argument,
but he does favor it. Leaving out the dogmatic assertions one
can use it to establish the existence of God, and Tennant
says of it, "The aesthetic argument for theism becomes more
persuasive when it renounces all claim to proof and appeals
to a logical probability."
9
In this manner the argument
becomes strong, for on the teleoscopic and the microscopic
scale Nature is "sublime or beautiful".... And Nature’s
beauty linked with an intelligent power strengthens the case
for theism.
In the case of the moral argument, Tennant criticises
that of A. R. Wallace, Kant, Dr. Rashdall, Dr. Barbour, and
Ritschl. For him these men are on this point rather ambitious,
and the valid is confounded with the existent. Tennant’s
beginning point is to consider the significance of the moral
order, and man as a part of Nature must take into account his
own moral values. Man is a child of nature in his physical
aspect, but man cannot be fully explained in terms of physical
Nature. Nature has also produced moral beings and is instru-
mental to moral life, thus Nature and moral man are at one with
each other.-1-0
From the epistomological argument, as discussed, the
argument from adaptation, the aesthetic, and the moral argument
Tennant has empirically approached theism. Conformity to law
9 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, II, p. 91.
10 Ibid., p. 103*
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is intrinsic in the world, back of that is the ontal, and is
intelligible. Moreover, Tennant concludes that the world is
a producer of values that in our rapport with it wre are
affected by it. This interaction between the human and the
divine is possible only on the personal plane of which Tennant
writes. With the establishment of the idea of the existence
of God, and the added concept that this Supreme Being is
personal, we must follow Tennant further to discover with him
the attributes of the Divine Personality.
As above mentioned, for Tennant, personality is a matter
of degree, and it is the highest interpretative concept.
The great theologian is here consistent with the idea of a
personal God in the Christian Scriptures, and in the Christian
religion, though, all Christian thinkers have not been
personalists . Personality, as Dr. Knudson writes, is known
to us directly only in the human form, and with it we
associate a body. But this body, he suggests, is not an
analytically necessary factor of our mental life, and con-
ceivably our inner personal life might go on apart from its
present material organism. Thus personality does not
necessarily imply corporeality.-1- 1 In its essence, Borden
Parker Bowne suggests it means self -hood, self-knowledge, and
self-direction. 0 Tennant only briefly discusses divine
personality in his Philosophical Theology
,
though he spends
11 Knudson, Doctrine of God
, pp. 292-293.
12 Bowne, Theism, p. 162.
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considerable time on the idea of God from which we can evolve
his conception of the divine personality. We must keep in
mind when dealing with his "highest interpretative function"
the attributes of absoluteness, freedom and consciousness, and
moral character. Tennant says of them,
"The divine nature may include more than
the potentialities of man indefinitely perfected,
even capacities as far removed from our ken as
human science is beyond the range of
cognition; but, whatever else it may or may not
include, it is at least characterized by in-
telligence, valuation, and volition." 15
The Absoluteness of God
Prom the historical viewpoint, Tennant critises a
priori theology. He finds Plato's difficulties with the
absolute to end in a resort to dualism where he deals in the
Timaeus with the relation of God to the sensible world. Here
Plato recognizes two causes of the world. Tennant suggests
that if the dualism be removed as a non-essential or as non-
Platonic, God becomes an Absolute subject with none but absolute
14
and intelligible objects, the outcome which should be acosmism.
God without the world, would yet be regarded as God. Aristotle
conceives of God as the unmoved Mover and Tennant writes that
"If there be an Actual world, the Deity of Aristotle should
have no av/areness of it, not to say no relations with it." 15
Both Plato and Aristotle, however, recognized the Actuality of
selves and the world. Plotinus, carrying the abstractive
13 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
II, p. 166.
14 Ibid., p. 152.
15 Ibid., p. 153.
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method further than his predecessors, according to Tennant,
postulated the Absolute One as neither a unity of absolute
subject and object, nor subject apart from objects, but a
being indeterminate enough to transcend the distinction
between the subjective and the objective. 16 Tennant also
rejects this ancient system of thought, assigning it with the
others to the province of imaginative art rather than to the
"business-like pursuit of knowledge or reasonable belief,
about man, the world, and God."
Tennant rejects the Absolute when described in terms
of "static concepts such as completedness
,
perfection, infini-
tude, immutability or timelessness, in the unqualified forms
in which they have been cherished by abstractive speculation,
or have been used in dialectic operation on thoughts and
unsifted word-meanings." 1
*
7 There can be no absoluteness of
God as a subject over against Whom are really no objects
save timeless validities holding of no ontal terms, for there
can be no accounting for the concrete many, or for the appear-
ance of the many. The connotation of the Absolute as
"independent of anything other" is rejected by Tennant. He
here deals well with the philosophical problem of relatedness,
for he thinks of God as dependent on the world as the world
is on God, "for God without a world is not God." 1® Thus, when
independence is meant when God is called absolute, it is
16 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, II, p. 153,
17 Ibid., p. "150 .
18 Ibid., p. 156 .
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rejected. Tennant also rejects Absoluteness when it is
construed as identical with infinity, static perfection,
necessary being, etc. 19
God is not Absolute in the sense of being the whole of
reality or of the existent, for that leads to pantheism or
acosmism. The Absolute then becomes the all, the totality,
the existent, hence distinct from God. The idea of the
Absolute may be conceived of in two forms, the one being the
ontal universe, the All, or the Whole, and the other an
on
individual Experient whose Experience constitutes Reality. v
In this first problem of the personality of God, viz..
Absoluteness, Tennant strikes a splendid note in the field
of relatedness. God is not Absolute in the sense of being the
whole or the all, and hence is not something far off, com-
pletely separate from man, and the world. There is an organic
interdependence between them. This seems to me to be, despite
its tinge of panpsychism, an adequate conception allowing for
a clear and definite relationship between God and the soul.
The ontal activities of the world-ground and of finite souls
more nearly coincide.
Freedom
Further in considering Tennant’s doctrine of the
personality of God, it is necessary to deal with the attri-
bute freedom, or more specifically as he discusses the problem,
19 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
II, p. 156.
20 Ibid., p. 157.
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whether or not God is infinite. He refrains from using the
phrase "a finite God”, yet insists that God is non-infinite.
"And it is not only in creation that
limitation is involved. Divine attributes,
such as power and love, in order to be corn-
possible, cannot be infinite or perfect in the
more unqualified senses in which those terms
have been wont to be used.^l
Here omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, eternity
and infinitude will be considered. Scrutinizing the notion
of omniscience, one finds two fundamental respects in which
Tennant conceives of the divine knowledge of the Actual world
as different from ours. He asserts that knowledge implies
objects. In the first place, the primary objects of our
cognition are the data of sense. These are posited for us
and not by us, whereas God posits the objects of His knowledge
by and for Himself. Secondly, in that embodiment, sense-
knowledge is precluded to God and cannot be attributed to Him.
Tennant writes,
"The first respect, then, in which divine
knowledge must be conceived as differing from
our knowledge of the Actual world, is that God's
objects are things per se whereas ours are
Phenomena. Another difT'erence that can safely be
asserted is constituted by the fact that God stands
not only in the relation of knower but also in that
of creator to His world." 22
In this relation of God to every part of the world and to the
world as a whole. He is omniscient as to all that has been, all
that is, and all that will be, in so far as it is the outcome
21 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
II, p. 173.
22 Ibid., p. 174 .
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of uniform causation.
This, Tennant believes, suggests a limitation, for the
future is knowable only in case the world-process is
mechanical. God as creator does not necessarily coerce free
agents, though He may sustain and inspire them. This creation
of free beings is self-limiting on the part of God in respect
to foreknowledge. "Foreknowledge implies predestination or
predetermination, and is incompatible with the freedom or
self-determination of human souls."23 Rather than this
limitation involving derogation from the Divine, hov/ever, it
allows for the religious expression of divine love. God is
beyond surprise and frustration, but He cannot know the
unknowable. He transcends time, a category of human thought,
yet no light is thrown upon the possibility of divine
prescience as to the outcome of human freedom. God is in this
respect, self-limiting.
Also in the problem of divine freedom comes the question
of omnipotence, whether or not God has the power to do all.
Tennant suggests that God is here limited by the impossible.
The Thinker of eternal truths is determinate, and the "sum of
eternal truths becomes the mode of God’s being and activity,
and is neither their prius nor their product." 24 This is
Tennant’s answer to the supposition that the possible is an
arbitrary creation of God, and that the possible and the
23 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
II, p. 176.
24 Ibid., p. 188.
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pc
impossible are alike to omnipotence, '•Tt/hat God is determines
possibilities; hence. He is limited by His determinateness.
One must allow for the nondoable such as creating a chaotic
universe that would contradict the structure of its orderliness,
or crash the moon into the sun without having either leave their
natural orbit. God determines the possible in the establish-
ment of the reality of His own nature and He may be omnipotent
within that realm which He limits Himself. Divine omnipotence
does not necessarily mean the power to act contrary to God’s
nature. It means, as Dr. Knudson points out, that God’s power
expresses itself perfectly and completely in and through his
.
26
nature
.
If, then, it is the nature of God to create and sustain
a world in which evil, for instance, is possible. He does so by
self-limitation. In this respect Tennant speaks of the "best
possible" world when discussing the problem of evil, and grants
God the attribute of omnipotence, though only within the
self-limitation of His own nature.
In discussing omnipresence to further establish Tennant’s
doctrine of the personality of God, we find that he rejects the
idea of omnipresence as it commonly is conceived, but holds
to the idea of divine immanence. In arriving at Tennant’s
conception of the divine immanence, it is well to first
consider what it is not. Immanence does not mean to Tennant
identity as indicated by Spinoza’s phrase Deus sive Natura .
It does not mean that God "is the one underlying substance of
25 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
II, p. 188.
26 Knudsj^n^-.D-QCtrine of God, pp,_260^21(1^
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which the world and all that is therein are the appearance to
us." Nor does it mean that He is the sole cause of all
becoming in the world which depends upon Him for its forth-
comingness. Further, Tennant writes that immanence cannot
mean "inactive” ubiquity or omnipresence. 27
Divine immanence then, involves activity, hence an
active relation of God to the world. Dismissing dualism,
since it is not a proven theory, Tennant however, adopts
pluralistic spiritualism as his metaphysical presupposition.
From this point of view there is no medium to be taken into
account, no inert matter, and no attempt is made to conceive
of divine immanence in "lifeless stuff". For Tennant matter
is ultimately spirit and spiritual monads are everywhere
existent. Then divine operation is called activity and
immanent in the rapport with these spiritual agents. And
these spiritual agents exist from the "barest monad up to the
souls of men and perhaps spirits of a higher order."22 Tennant
holds that communication may be even more intimate between
God and the monads than the souls of men.
The divine indwelling in man involves considerations
different from God*s immanence in the physical world. If the
purpose of the world is ethical, God is limited in His immanent
action upon self-determining and moral persons. God does not
possess or use the human mind or soul as a passive instrument.
27 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
II, pp. 210-211
28 Ibid., p. 218.
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Man is not a mouthpiece of God if he is a free being.
Tennant writes, "..in moralized man immanence is not to be
postulated as divine influence on moral conduct."29 He thus
rejects divine immanence in man in any form in which it invades
man's personality when appropriating truth or forming moral
character.
Closely allied with the problem of omnipresence is that
of Eternity. This too, must be considered in constructing
Tennant's doctrine of the personality of God. He concedes
that God is a non-temporal being in the sense of being con-
fined by time. The meaning of the term, however, can be
misconstrued. In one sense eternity is thought of as endless
duration or everlastingness. Tennant points out that if
endless duration was held as the valid idea of eternity, God
would not have the limitation of the past and the future of
the time span, but He would have the limitation of not dis-
criminating experiences as earlier and later.^ The notion of
endless duration is, however, rejected by Tennant as philoso-
phically useless. Eternity has also been construed as
timelessness. This too, Tennant rejects when he writes, "God
and spirits are not eternal in the sense in which truths of
reason are timeless. "32 Also he rejects the idea that all
"Reality" is timeless and all temporality is illusory. This
theory offers no details as to the time-process.
29 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
II, p. 221.
30 Ibid., p. 223.
31 Ibid., p. 131.
32 Ibid., p. 133.
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In brief, Tennant says of eternity, that
1. If "eternal" means endless duration it is without
special significance for theology
2. If the word means absolutely timeless, it is
predicable only of truths or reason and not
the existent.
3. If it denotes the noumenal in the Kantian
sense or supra-temporality
,
the eternal and
the temporal are functionally related, hence
temporality is not purely illusory. No
satisfactory formulation of the supra-
temporal order, is, however, evidenced.
4. The eternal "specious present", without
succession, is an untenable conception.
5. As used in the fourth gospel, "eternal" means
a prediction of spiritual values, without
having reference to time or timelessness
,
and
being indifferent to both. 3
Duration and succession are modes, however, which Tennant
concedes to the ontal as well as to phenomenal being. Thus
there is a relation between eternity and time. On this basis,
Tennant makes the statement,
"If the world-ground, the Supreme Being
who designed and created the world, be also the
Eternal, His supra-temporality must be so conceived
as not to leave souls and the world-process matters
of indifference to Him, or to preclude rapport
between Him and beings in whom ’time is*1 and whose
deeds are in Time." 3^
Thus while Tennant qualifies the word, one finds the
personal God of which he writes to have the attribute of
freedom. It is evident that while he does not believe in a
finite God, he does not conceive of God as infinite. The
33 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
II, pp. 138-139.
34 Ibid., pp. 139-140* * Cf. Brightman, "Journal of Religion",
p. §55. "God is not a timeless being; He is an ever enduring
creator. His existence is an eternally changing present."
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meanings of infinite are, according to Tennant-
-
1. The notion of the boundless, that devoid of all
defining limitation.
2. Infinite is used in the mathematical sense
meaning limitless in number, time, or space:
"that which cannot be reached by successive
acts of addition or division."
3. From some of the early Greek philosophers
comes the idea of a 'boundlessness that is
neither quantitative nor identical with inde-
terminateness, but is rather completeness or
perfectness, as illustrated by the circle,
which is an endless line but a definite figure." 33
4. In the modern period., some of the earlier
philosophers regarded infinity as identical
with perfection, or implied therein. 36
In this historical progression of thought, Tennant sees the
meaning of "infinity" changing from indeterminateness and from
quantitative endlessness to something qualitative and positive.
He sees infinitude abdicating in favor of perfection and writes,
"The world-ground is not an infinite, in the sense of an
indeterminate being." 37 Infinite, Tennant holds, bears a
definite and distinctive mathematical meaning, and hence, as
a theologian he surrenders it to the mathematician. 3 ^
While Tennant rejects the word "infinite", the idea it
connotes is still retained, and it is difficult to see where
he draws the line between finite and infinite. To him, God
is neither. In the notion of omniscience, he limits God, yet
in reality it is only self-limitation on the part of God
35 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, II, p. 140.
36 Ibid., pp. l4o-141.
37 Ibid., pp. 141-142.
38 Ibid., p. 143.
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in that God is omniscient in regards to the mechanical world
process, but not in regards to God-created free beings. Again,
it is a bit difficult to arrive at Tennant’s view of God's
freedom in regards to omnipotence, for he denies God omnipotence
being limited by the impossible. In a law abiding universe, the
impossible or nondoable is not demanded in the nature of God to
make Him omnipotent. He need not "be able to' make the past not
to have been*
,
as Thomas Aquinas put it"
,
nor need make a
straight stick with only one end, nor a round ball with a flat
side. He need not act contrary to the nature of reality to
be omnipotent. God is thus granted omnipotence within the self-
limitation of His own nature. Tennant also limits God in
regards to omnipresence, yet again we see He is limited only in
His immanent action upon self-determining and moral persons.
Eternity, as ascribed to God by Tennant, allows Him freedom
although God is definitely related to the time span; hence.
He is related to beings who exist in time.
Divine Consciousness
Tennant attributes self-consciousness to divine
personality, yet divests from it the limitations that are spec-
ifically human. Let us consider this attribute in establishing
Tennant’s doctrine of the personality of God for here again
again the relationship between the human and the divine is
evidenced. In the chapter pertaining to the soul, it was
seen that Tennant posits self-consciousness in man by objects
from which the ego distinguishes itself. The question can then
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be carried over into divine personality. Does the conscious-
ness of God need to be affirmed by similar conditioning?
Tennant dismisses this by accepting the view that God without
a world or a Real other, is not God, but an abstraction. 59
The idea of a developing self-consciousness on the part of
t
Deity is incompatible with theism.
’’For theism primarily consists in the asser-
tions that, as ground of this world, God must be
an intelligent and ethical being, and that, when
conceived apart from and prior to His world, God
becomes a cosmologically useless idea, in that
then we can no more conceive an actual transition
from a worldless God to God and a world than we
can find a logical way from the absolute One to a
finite Many.”^°
Thus divine personality involves self-consciousness.
Coupled with this, in the case of human beings, personality
involves unity. While granting unity to God, Tennant considers
the idea of plurality within the Godhead. 41 This argument
he bases upon the theory that God could not be an ethically
perfect being unless there was within or besides Himself
eternally another; ’’For perfect love there must be perfect
reciprocity and communicability." 42 From the principle of
continuity one can also argue to the pluralistic conception
of Deity. As there are societies on the human plane, so
there may be on the lower and higher spheres, and Tennant
suggests that there would be nothing shocking to conceive a
divine society in the ultimate One rather than a sole
39 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, II, p. 168.
40 Ibid., p.~T6B.
a
41 Ibid., p. 169.
42 Ibid., p. 169.
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individual. Thus he makes the statement,
"There cannot he a plurality of discordant
and conflicting world-grounds, from the point of
view of either philosophy or religion; hut there
would seem to be no prima facie reason why the
one unity embracing the universe should not,
like the universe itself, be a many in one, though
self-subsistent . "43
God could then, still be personal even if not a person. "The
unity comprising the supreme olurality would be a unity of
concurrent wills, of joint purposes, of moral harmony, and of
co-operant agencies." 44 While Tennant does not advocate these
ideas, he does hold to the idea that in the totality of the
world as an organic whole there is the creative and indwelling
spirit of the one supreme monad. Beyond this unity in the
personality of God, Tennant does not go.
Closely akin to unity within divine consciousness is
the problem of immutability. Tennant writes that the ontal
is responsible for phenomenal change, but the ontal may also
change. 45 It is however on the personal plane that through
changing activity Deity remains the same. In the case of the
soul, activity is as much a characteristic of it as is
permanence and self-identity. Thus Tennant substitutes for
the static conception of immutability, the idea of activity,
when he writes, "The divine immutability, in fact, can only
be self-identity and self-consistency through change."^ 5
43 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
II, p. 171.
44 Ibid., p. 172.
45 Ibid., p. 25.
46 Ibid., p. 149.
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Divine intelligence was discussed somewhat in the
preceding section of this chapter under omniscience. In
ascribing self-consciousness to God, Tennant also adds
intelligence. This divine intelligence is evidenced both in
creating the world and in sustaining it. The world is
intelligible and behind the phenomenal realm lies the divine
intelligence. God is self-conscious, then, from Tennant’s
viewpoint. His personality also involves unity, immutability
through change, and intelligence..
Moral Character of God
Finally, in a consideration of Tennant’s doctrine of
the personality of God, it is necessary to discuss his
conception of the moral character of God. At the heart of
true religion lies trust and faith in a good God. Yet in the
past the idea of the divine did not necessarily contain an
ethical content. This has been a gradual development. Great
impetus to the belief in a moral deity was given in the ethical
monism of the Hebrews, fostered particularly by the prophets.
God was moral and righteous, merciful and just. Added to this
was the idea of holiness, and later in Jesus’ view comes the
idea of goodness and self-sacrificing love. This is the
common Christian conception of the moral character of God,
Tennant argues for the moral character of God largely
in his empirical manner, writing that moral man belongs to a
moral order. Thus "If man is Nature’s child. Nature is the
wonderful mother of such a child. Further, Nature’s
47 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
II, p. 101
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uniformity and impartiality are a "precondition of all
intelligent, and therefore of all moral, life. In this respect
Nature is the power that makes it possible for noumenal man
to be, as phenomenal man, a moral being."48 In this manner
the world, as Tennant generalizes, is instrumental to the
emergence, maintenance, and progressiveness of morality. 17
Back of the moral nature of man is the moral author.
Tennant is quite critical in discussing "perfection",
however, as an attribute of a moral God. In examining the
meanings which the word has borne we find:
1. The perfect being has meant pure being.
This Tennant rejects from his theistic point of view.
2. It has meant a being that is universal yet
individual, containing all Reality or all
Real predicates as well as the material of
all possibility.
This Tennant rejects as being indeterminate and a deified
nothingness
.
3. Perfection has meant completedness
,
becoming
synomous with immutability.
This view Tennant rejects on the static plane. 50 Thus Tennant
holds that the notion of perfection when unqualified is an
impossible concept. However, when qualification is introduced
51in a specific manner, he applies the ethical attribute to God.
Despite the fact that Tennant argues from moral man to
48 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, II, p. 102.
49 Ibid., p.T(72'.
50 Ibid., pp. 143-145.
51 Ibid., p. 146.

a moral God, he states that the conception of a Good God
cannot he reached hy idealizing virtues imperfectly manifested
in man. Man is limited hy his own specific nature and hy the
conditions of his life. On the other hand, Tennant holds
I
that when this conditioning element is eliminated, God has a
moral experience and activity because He is necessarily free
from "creaturely imperfection". Thus righteousness and holi-
ness are ascribed to a God of "volitional self-determination
and consistence". And this, for Tennant, "embodies the import
of the empirically reached conclusion that the world, of which
God is the ground, realizes an ethical design in that the
moral status of rational creatures is a stage in the ordered
world-process
,
if not its climax in respect of value." 52 God
from Tennant* s point of view is free in His moral activity
from this human conditioning, hence his moral nature is
largely incomparable with the morality of human nature.
After thus airing his views, Tennant comes back to a
God who has a moral character, something more than abstract
perfection or static immutability, a God who, in His moral
nature, has also goodness and love. He writes,
"... the divine perfection, if it include
more than morality, cannot be static completedness
,
but is rather self-manifestation of the Eternal
in the temporal process of ethically significant
history. "5o
In this relatedness of God to man, God does not foist
His moral nature into human beings, i.e.,
52 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
II, p. 148.
53 Ibid., p. 149.
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He does not invade the personality of free ethical beings.
Summary
Prom the idea that in divine personality we have the
highest interpretative concept as the key to reality, we
have tried to trace through Tennant’s work his doctrine of the
personality of God. In the first place, Tennant empirically
establishes the existence of God as a Supreme Being who is
personal. His idea of the absoluteness of God, however, is
a bit confusing in that he denied the absoluteness of God,
but only within self-limitation . He dealt critically with
the problem of relatedness. The attribute of freedom, Tennant
grants to God, but again within the field of self-limitation
as in the idea of omniscience. God, for Tennant, is a unitary
world-ground even if pluralistic; He is immutable in the
active sense, and He is an intelligent being. Tennant also
conceives of God as a moral being, not perfect in an abstract
sense, but in specific attributes that make Him the moral
creator, designer, and sustainer of a moral universe. The
discussion of the relationship of Tennant’s idea of the soul
to his doctrine of the personality of God will be established
on the basis of these divine attributes, absoluteness, freedom,
consciousness, and moral character.
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V, TENNANT »S IDEA OF THE SOUL RELATED
TO HIS DOCTRINE OF THE PERSONALITY
OF GOD
Thus far in the study, the development of the idea of
the soul has been traced and an investigation made into
contemporary views of it. We have attempted to delineate
Tennant's view and relate his position to the others discussed.
His doctrine of the personality of God has been established
and the problem is now to relate that to his idea of the
soul, though that relationship may already be apparent.
The Existence of the Soul and God
The first point to consider in such a relationship is
the existence of both the soul and God. It was seen that
some writers deny the existence of either God or the soul, or
both. Tennant, however, as a panpsychistic personalist,
firmly believes in the existence of both. They are two
major parts of the seeming trilogy that weaves itself through-
out his work, viz., God, the world, and the soul.
He attempts to establish empirically the existence of
both. In the case of the soul, he states that before one can
know others, he must have a rudimentary knowledge of himself.
The body is the first mediator. Then by mediation of other
selves, one believes in them, and also in the existence of
one's self. By communication with other selves one has self-
knowledge. Thus Tennant develops his idea until he is able
to make the statement.
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"Consciousness involves a subject; there is
awareness of consciousness; therefore, as cognition
does not create its primary objects, there is
knowledge of the involved subject's existence." 1
The soul is active, and activity implies existence. Further
Tennant writes, ". . inasmuch as, unless there be a spirit
in man, it is idle for him to talk of a God in the world,..."
2
After establishing the existence of the spirit in the
world, which he calls the soul, Tennant talks of the idea of
God. Both are actually existent. He arrives at a belief in
the existence of God through several routes. In the first
place he uses the epistemological argument to argue from the
adaptation of thought to thing. The relationship of thought
and thing achieves its greatest significance in the postulating
of a God. From the adaptiveness of organisms and inorganic
nature, the teleological argument, Tennant posits a God. He
also favors the aesthetic argument, finding Nature on its
largest and smallest scales, "sublime or beautiful". Lastly,
he uses the moral argument, saying that Nature produced moral
beings and is instrumental to moral life. Thus in the
relationship of God and the soul, Tennant first postulates
their existence, writing as before mentioned,
"We must continue to attribute existence
.... to supersensible and possible timeless
entities, e.g., the soul and God."5
From this starting point, he is consistent and has a ground
for the relationship of the idea of the soul and God. He
1 Tennant, Philosophical Theology, I, p. 77.
2 Ibid., p. 94 .
3 Ibid., p. 373
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attributes to the idea of both Actuality or Reality.
The Absoluteness of God and the Soul
Considering further, the relationship of the tv/o subjects
at hand, the question of Absoluteness arises. As is commonly
understood, God is Absolute, and one discusses under this
heading omnipotence, omnipresence, and eternity. Knudson says
of the Absoluteness of God,
"It is this which differentiates the divine
from the human and from all finite beings, and gives
to it its uniqueness. Personality and goodness are
characteristics that God shares with man, but
absoluteness sets Him apart from all creaturely
existence
.
Tennant, however, rejects the idea of the Absolute as commonly
conceived, hence the attributes of omnipotence, omnipresence,
and eternity were discussed under divine freedom.
The Absolute, as Tennant seems to conceive it, is
nothing more than reality, existence. He rejects the idea
of the Absolute when couched in "static terms" such as
completedness
,
perfection, infinitude, immutability, or
timelessness. He can not conceive of an absolute God inde-
pendent from the world or man. This would seem to be pantheism,
yet he guards himself from that in holding that God is not
absolute in the sense of the whole of reality. He does,
however, in maintaining the dependence of God upon the world
and man, seem to think of the Absolute within which is God and
the soul, both interdependent. God may be the creator and the
- . . - . . ..
4 Knudson, Doctrine of God
,
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and the divine energizer, yet seemingly He is part of the
Absolute with the soul. Tennant is hard to understand at
this point, and it is difficult to see where he draws the line
between God and the many souls. He would not fuse them
together, yet holds to their interdependence. Regardless of
what one may think of this position, from the standpoint of
this paper, Tennant definitely relates the soul and God. The
finite soul, in not being absolute, is most certainly dependent
upon the divine. But when the divine is denied absoluteness
in the usual meaning of the word, and is dependent upon the
soul of man, while there may or may not be a fusion of the
two, they are quite clearly seen to be organically related.
Freedom
In the relationship of Tennant’s idea of the soul to
of
his idea of God, the attribute^freedom plays a large part.
One may believe in an infinite or a finite God, and finite
selves, yet posit no definite relation between them. A finite
God may or may not be limited in his relation to man. On the
other hand, an infinite God as creator and sustainer of the
universe may be beyond a specific vital relation to an
individual soul. Tennant holds to neither of these views.
God for him is not finite, nor is he infinite: He is limited
by free beings. This would still be justifiably termed
infinite, however, in that it is self-limitation. The freedom
of the soul, is of course, humanly limited. Tennant writes
of this point,
.
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I"The ultimate limit to human freedom
consists in the fact that the soul’s intrinsic
nature and responsiveness in feeling are posited
for it, not by it." 5
i
Thus God and the soul are free within certain limitations.
.
In the problem of omniscience, Tennant limits God in
that He does not have foreknowledge of human choices, i.e.,
God has foreknowledge only on the mechanical plane. Man, in
his human limitation, attempts mechanical foreknowledge as in
the case of astronomy, and he even goes to the point of
postulating future outcomes of human behavior within the limits
of research and human nature. In that the soul and God are
mutually limited in knowledge, from Tennant 1 s viewpoint, they
are inter-related. Knowledge of the divine, who is thus
self-limiting, is the supreme quest of the soul.
In the problem of omnipotence, God again limits himself
by his determinateness. In dealing with the problem of evil,
Tennant points out that God’s omnipotence is limited as in
creating a world in which evil is possible, for it is the
"best possible world." Tennant does not state, however,
whether or not his devil type of thing, the elan vital which
accounts for evil, is free, hence he does not deal well with
this problem.
In the consideration or divine immanence, or indwelling
in man as separate from divine immanence in the world, God is
further limited in his action upon self-determining and moral.
5 Tennant, Cf. Sir James Marchant. The Future of Christianity
, j
pp. 188-189 •
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persons. Yet Tennant* s metaphysical presupposition is
pluralistic spiritualism, and from this viewpoint communication
may be more intimate between God and the soul than between
the souls of men.
On the basis of a relation between time and eternity,
Tennant also holds to the idea of rapport between God and—
the soul "in whom ‘time is’ and whose deeds are in time". The
Supreme Being is eternal, but definitely related to those in
the time process. This is exactly the line of thought
followed by Kierkegaard as expressed by Dr. Geismar of the
University of Copenhagen when he said that man lives in time,
but is rooted in eternity, for to exist is to realize the
connection between eternity and time. 6
On the basis of freedom then, there is, from Tennant’s
viewpoint, a very definite relationship between God and the
soul. Tennant seems to juggle the words of philosophical
and theological parlance, and especially on the problem of
freedom, for he grants God freedom to know, and to
transcend space and time, yet always within the self-limitation
of His having created free souls, and one never knows exactly
where to draw the line of demarcation. On this precarious
basis, however, he more firmly than ever establishes his
point that God and the soul are organically related.
Consciousness
On the basis of consciousness, Tennant also relates the
6 Kierkegaard, Lecture by Geismar given at Harvard, April 19,’ 36,
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soul to God. He states that the soul arrives at self-conscious-
ness in a different manner than does God, for the soul depends
upon the body and other souls for mediators of self-conscious-
ness whereas, God does not have a developing self-consciousness.
He does not need to be conditioned in such a manner, and yet
one finds in Tennant the idea that there is no such thing as
a God without a world or a "Heal other". This would seem to
indicate at least a tendency on Tennant’s part, even though
he verbally denies it, to think that divine self-consciousness
;
is mediated by the world and the soul, or the "Real other".
Tennant conceives of the self-consciousness of the soul
and God in their unity, continuity, and intelligence. Within
the unity of God there is plurality, many monads within one
supreme monad. Of the soul Tennant holds that it is unitary
in a truly individual sense, yet may be complex in its many
states or objects. In this manner both God and the soul are
conscious of a unity. And within the idea of personality such
unity is possible from the standpoint of free intelligence.
God knows himself apart from the soul, and the soul knows
itself apart from God, yet both are consciously inter-related.
Also on the personal plane of consciousness the soul and God
maintain self-conscious identity through change. In the case
of the soul, the conscious continuity is evidenced in the
bond of connection between mental states. The self-conscious-
ness is mediated in part by the different states or relations
between them. Conscious activity also accounts for identity
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through change on the part of the divine. The self-
consciousness in God is further evidenced by intelligence in
creating and sustaining an orderly universe, and intelligence
pertains to the self-consciousness of the soul when man
attempts to know phenomenal reality and pushes even beyond
that to metaphysical reality. In Tennant* s conception that
the soul is not a blank, but is cognitive, he follows the
idea that it is self-consciously intelligent, for it attempts
to know the organic relatedness of the world that God posits.
In self-consciousness then, there is inter-relatedness between
the soul and God. j
i
Moral Character
Prom the standpoint of moral character, Tennant also
relates the soul to God. He uses the empirical method as
usual rather than the a priori
,
for after postulating a God
and the noumenal soul, he relates their goodness in the nou-
menal realm. The world may be instrumental to the emergence,
maintenance, and progressiveness of morality, for back of
moral man is the moral author.
When considering the soul, it is the condition and
standard of primitive individual evaluation; and when aided
by an intellectually grounded choice, higher values are sought.
Tennant writes,
"Psychologically, a pleasure of ’higher’
value to an individual, is one to which value is
assigned only at a psychologically higher level
of self-hood or self-knowledge."^
7 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
I, p. 145*
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Through, the intellect moral goodness may develop, and when
souls or selves are interested in a common ideal good, there
may be a possible advance "from the good, in the sense of what
is desired by a self for itself, to the good as what is
desired by an organic whole, composed of a plurality of more
or less co-operant and consentient selves."® Then along
with intelligence, knowledge, a socialized conscience, and
moral insight determine moral progress. Moral insight Tennant
says "is largely intellectual discernment of existential
truth, determinative of conative disposition." 9 In this
manner of rational method Tennant validates his morality of
the soul, and in true personalistic language adds "that there
is no good that is not good for something; that, apart from
reference to values and their ends, 'the good' is but a name
for nothing." 10 Goodness is not to be conceived of as
something abstract, static, or complete, but a quality within
the moral character of the soul or God. Thus the soul is seen
to develop its moral nature toward the supreme morality of a
good God. God, in His freedom, as previously mentioned, does
not foist His moral nature upon man, who also is free, but
He posits such a world that the moral nature of the soul may
work to achieve its individual and social perfection in
harmony with the ethical character of the divine. This is
8 Tennant, Philosophical Theology
,
I, p. 146.
9 Ibid.
, p. 147 .
10 Ibid., pp. 169-160.
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consistent with organic pluralism, and is most logical
from Tennant’s own metaphysical position of spiritualistic
pluralism.
Summary
In this section relating the tv/o existents involved
in the problem of this paper the attempt has been made to point
out their similarities and differences, and the basis for
Tennant's belief in the organic relationship of the soul to God.
Earlier in the paper it was seen that Tennant ascribed to the
soul unity, simplicity within complexity, self-consciousness,
individuality, continuity, existence with an essence as in
moral character, and stated that it is to be known noumenally.
These qualities Tennant also attributed to God, though in the
chapter dealing specifically with his doctrine of the personal-
ity of God divine absoluteness, freedom consciousness, and
moral character were the headings under which they were dis-
cussed.
From the relationship as expounded, several conclusions
have been reached. First, Tennant establishes the existence
of both God and the soul, and this existence is something more
than mere being; it is existence with a definite essence that
may be known to man. Upon this basis a relation of the soul
to God may be built.
11 Brightman, Personality and Religion
,
p.151.
Professor Brightman says of the term organic pluralism,
"Religiously, the term corresponds to the theistic faith in a
personal God who controls the cosmic order, yet gives a consider*
able degree of freedom to the many selves and persons other than
himself." Souls and God are thus free but ethically cooperative
for the organic whole in which they are related.
,t \
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Second, in denying God absoluteness in the static
conception of the word, Tennant closely related Him to the soul*
In the theological concept that God is the Absolute totally
apart from the soul, one harks back to mediaeval days, and
leads to such an extreme position as that taken by Barth.
From Tennant’s viewpoint absolute seems to mean existence
and within that there is an organic and interdependent
relatedness of the soul and God.
Third, on the basis of freedom Tennant’s position is
that the soul and God are inter-related for God is self-limited
by the creation of free beings in omniscience, omnipotence,
and omnipresence, and there is a relationship between time
and eternity, the one ascribed to the soul and the other to
God •
Fourth, both God and the soul are self-conscious, God
being dependent on the world and the soul as mediator in much
the same manner as the soul comes to self-consciousness through
the mediation of something exterior. Both are conscious of
unity, continuity or immutability, and intelligence.
Fifth, both the soul and God have a moral character;
God’s is seen in the moral universe and man’s in that he is a
child of the universe. Thus on the personal! stic plane
tinged with a metaphysical presupposition Tennant calls
spiritualistic pluralism, he holds that the soul, while free,
is dependent upon God, and God, while the Supreme Being of the
universe, is dependent upon some "Real other", the soul, or
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souls. It is this panpsychism of his which many object to
that enables Tennant to establish a definite relationship
between the soul and God.
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VI. CRITICISM
The preceding chapters of the thesis have been devoted
to the exposition of Tennant* s idea of the soul in the light
of historical development and contemporary thought, and then
related to his doctrine of the personality of God. The
seemingly logical progression of the discussion leads to a
criticism of that discovered relationship although one may
have already felt the criticism of the writer in certain aspects
because of incidental comments. Throughout, however, the attempt
has been an exposition without predilection. The criticism
of Tennant* s position in regard to the subject at hand, is the
task of this chapter.
It is an interesting task to criticize the position of
this brilliant philosophical theologian on his ideas of the
soul and God, for the very thing which from his viewpoint
establishes their close interrelatedness is the weak link in
the chain of his speculative thought^^h&t is his failure to
sharply distinguish his many concepts and to state concretely
his position. Let me validate this seemingly contradictory
statement by considering first the points in his favor
and then giving a statement of my objections.
1.) First in Tennant* s favor would seem to be his zeal
for the use of unbiased facts. He calls this the empirical
method which in the first chapter^Shllfesophlcal Theology he
plainly stated is the method he follows. He calls Plato the
Adam of a priori philosophy and hopes for a new Adam^Like
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stature to pursue the ordo cognoscendi
.
This is splendid; yet
it goes too far in putting the a. priori method outside the realm
of metaphysical knowledge. Experience, as Tennant states, can-
not be deduced from a priori principles. However empiricism
"has often been narrow in ignoring the a priori element in
experience. .
1
In this sense of the & priori revealing itself in
experience we may say with Bov/ne that "apriorism" is establish
2
ed. Although Tennant does not use it, he arrives at the same
conclusion empirically that others do by the use of the a-
priori. Despite this minor criticism it is in Tennant’s favor
that he deduces his truth solely from experience itself, for
here one feels his sincere scholarship.
2.) Closely akin to this, there is in Tennant’s favor
his boldness to try new paths of thought
,
for he clearly
states that the old conceptions here dealt with are inadequate.
Certainly we need new light on such problems as Absoluteness,
freedom. Divine consciousness, and goodness. For the most part
1 concede the necessity of his demands, but after having made
them he comes out with no clear statement, no concrete position
of his own. For instance, he rejects the idea of n a finite God"
yet insists that God is non-infinite, or he writes that God is
not omnipresent in the old sense of the word, yet is immanent
in the world. Despite this weakness, his effort toward new
X l3owne, '.theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 364 .
2 Ibid., p 364 .
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conceptions is to be commended.
5.) Largely in Tennant’s favor, and that which made this
study possible, is his postulation of the existence of both
the soul and God. In this day of contradictory and conflicting
philosophies concerning these two actualities, it is refreshing
and encouraging to find so brilliant a leader of intellectual
circles espousing them earnestly enough to write his
Philosophical Theology in which they play the major part. And
above all, I agree with Tennant that both the soul and God
exist on the personal plane. They have definite characteristics
within the "tether of fact-controlled speculation".
4.
) Prom the religious point of view and in line with
the Christian hope, Tennant, although he does not discuss it,
maintains that facts suggest we have no scientific reason to
disbelieve in the continued existence of the soul "after dis-
solution of the body which, in this life, conditions its
/v
inherent activities.
5.
) Finally, in Tennant’s favor, is his position which
so definitely establishes an organic interrelatedness between
the soul and God. This has been evident throughout the
preceding chapter in the characteristics of absoluteness,
freedom. Divine consciousness and moral character on the part
of both the soul and God. Prom the point of internal criticism,
Tennant, while not clear in defining his own position, does
evolve a system of relatedness. This establishes the worth and
dignity of the human soul, while religiously it allows for
communion with a personal God.
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My objections to Tennant’s position in the foregoing
study are few, although to me they are important. As above
suggested, he founders on the very thing which makes this study
of relatedness possible, the many grades and types of souls.
1.
) He fails to make clear,.always , statements of his
position, although he clearly and emphatically from time to
time expresses his dissatisfaction with competing or old ideas.
It is difficult to understand him because of this. He dismisses
an old concept of some attribute of God and then fails to make
his new idea clear. His trouble may be one of language, for he
will deny God such qualities as omnipresence, or immutability,
yet in the end comes back to a belief in them. Of the two
subjects involved, i.e., the soul and God, Tennant gives a much
clearer discussion of the soul. Again and again contradictions
will seem to arise. For instance, he asserts emphatically that
the idea of immanence is superfluous along with the idea of
revelation. He then comes back to a belief in a God existent
everywhere and concludes that revelation is possible when
conditioned by human receptivity.
2.
) God is either infinite or finite. Tennant is not
clear here for he denies both, stating that God is non-infinite.
He adds that God is self-limited. If God is self-limited, as in
the case of human freedom, that is quite different from a finite
God.
3.
)Also in a consideration of freedom of God and the soul
there arises the problem of evil with which Tennant encounters
difficulty. He has an elan vital, devil type of thing
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to account for evil and does not clearly state whether or not
it is free, God cannot be relieved of responsibility unless the
many souls are free,
4,
) A difficulty arises, too, in Tennant’s postulation of
a gradation of souls. In such a system there is no sharp line of
demarcation from one level to another. Nor can there be ascribed
definite characteristics of the soul if there are numerous souls
of all levels of existence. One level would necessarily differ
from another level. 3
5,
) Finally, the dignity of God is reduced if one
believes with Tennant that God is dependent upon a created
being such as man. Herein lies the key to Tennant's belief in
the organic relatedness of the trilogy: the world, the soul,
and God. But if God is the all powerful creator and sustainer
of the universe, he is not necessarily dependent upon the souls
which he created.
It is thus seen that there are both merits^and objections
to Tennant's position of an organic relatedness between the
soul and God. The fact of the relationship is most encouraging;
yet, the system of his philosophy through which the relationship
is established is a bit beyond my comprehension, i.e., I do not
agree with him in his panpsychism.
been
This has nevertheless
A
a rewarding study-not only in its
critical aspects, and in Tennant's method of handling data
concerning the soul, but also in revealing the possibility of
establishing a closer relationship between the soul and God.
Tennant points out the path one must follow if he is ever
5 see, following page.
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successfullyAaccomplish this within the realm of scientific
fact and philosophical speculation*
If a closer relationship between the soul and God were
clearly established, it would revolutionize the thinking of the
age. Many deny the existence of either God or the soul, or
both. Even if they do grant the existence of both, they feel
only a vague indefinite relationship. Man, in his age long
search for power, would find the answer if he could actually
feel his soul at one with God.
Thus, while I do not agree with all of the conclusions
reached by Tennant or even his underlying principle of pan-
psychism, I heartily embrace his personalistic trend of thought
and find inspiration and incentive for deeper speculation on
this age old problem. He has revealed many insights into the
nature of the soul.
To study Tennant is both refreshing and stimulating, for
he aims to have no philosophical prejudices or theological
leanings. He has broken somewhat from the past, but only in his
effort to blaze a new trail to the citadel of truth. He has been
kindly, philosophical, and scientific, bhile I do not agree with
all of his statements, nor follow him in all his ideas, I must
humbly confess that in this internal criticism of the problem
of his idea of the soul as related to his doctrine of the
personality of God, I have found a piece of work worthy of real
study that will not cease with the conclusion of the thesis.
3 Every type and varitety of soul need not necessarily have
the same characteristics in the same manner or capacity as
the human soul such as in the case of moral character, reason,
and self-consciousness.
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SUMMARY
The problem of this paper has been to establish Tennant*
s
idea of the soul and his doctrine of the personality of God so
that the relationship between the two could be considered.
Because of his position it was discovered that a definite
relationship between the two existed.
In view of the fact that there is today a great deal of
disrespect for the soul idea, the first chapter was a brief
survey of the historical development of the idea of the soul
which revealed the rich background that is Tennant’s. The idea
of the soul has been discussed by the great thinkers of all the
ages. The primitive resorted to animism. The early Greek
thinkers, Socrates and Plato being the outstanding figures,
revealed insights about the soul. Jewish thought played its
part as did the early Christian thinkers. Through the medieval
period Aquinas and Scotus kept alive the problem so that when
we come to modern thinkers we find Tennant in line with his
predecessors in accepting the new activistic conception of the
soul.
In the second chapter pertaining to contemporary views
of the soul, the attempt has been to further validate Tennant’s
position in the light of modern thought. Psychologies go from
extreme denial of the soul in behaviorism to the eager
acceptance of it by self-psychology, with which Tennant allies
himself. Philosophically the case is quite similar for the
pendulum of current thought swings from the positivistic denial
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to the most adequate conception embraced by Personalism with
which Tennant also associates himself. Thus among all the
conflicting psychological and philosophical theories, Tennant’s
position is in line with the strongest of our day.
With this background his idea of the soul was given
specific consideration. He established its existence through
the self consciousness of the individual as distinct from the
physical and other selves. The soul from his viewpoint is
simple, though it may have different states. It is individual
and unitary. It is a continuant, and is cognitive. Also,
it is to be known noumenally rather than phenomenally. Tennant
holds to no theory of the origin or the destination of the
soul, but writes that "the soul was before us as besouled
organism, and that being so, we have no scientific reason
to disbelieve in its continued existence. . . m1 . The soul,
then, is conceived by Tennant to exist on the personal plane.
In a consideration of his doctrine of the personality
of God one again finds the personal plane to be the key to
reality. Upon this plane Tennant established the existence of
God. He denied God Absoluteness, but maintained He is part of
the Absolute, Freedom he ascribes to God within Self-limitation
Further he holds thatOGod is immutable in the active sense of
the word; He is intelligent, and a moral being.
In the relationship of Tennant’s idea of the soul to
to his doctrine of the personality of God, the existence of
1 Tennant, Aiiiosophlcal Theology
,
Vol. I, p. 104.
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both is the starting point. Prom there on, the organic relation-
ship of the soul to God is clearly established, for this
existence is more than mere being, it is existence with a
definite essence that may be known. Tennant conceives of God
and the soul as interdependent within the Absolute. They are
interrelated on the basis of freedom, for the freedom of the
soul is dependent upon the self limitation of God, and Tennant
further holds that God is dependent upon that which He has
created. On the basis of self-consciousness both are related,
being conscious of unity, continuity, and intelligence while
being dependent upon each other. They both have moral character
the soul assuming the character of its creator. Thus the
organic inter-dependence and interrelatedness is established
between the soul and God.
In a criticism of the facts revealed in the study I
merely stated my opinions about the conclusion reached. Tennant
is to be commended 1.) for his empirical use of factual data,
2.) his boldness in rejecting old opinions with which he dis-
agreed, 3.) the thoroughness with which he postulates the
existence of the soul and God, 4.) his faith in the immortality
of the soul, and 5.) his postulation of the organic inter-
relatedness of the soul and God. I objected to 1.) Tennant’s
failure to state clearly his position, 2.) Also* his difficulty
with the infinitude of God, 3.) his difficulty with the
question of freedom in regard to the problem of evil, 4.) his
belief in the gradation of souls, and 5.) the manner in which
he reduces the dignity of God by making Him little more than
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a component part of the trilogy, the world, the soul, and God.
As before stated, this has been a rewarding study. It
has given me insight into both the nature of the soul and God.
Tennant encourages me to seek for myself a satisfying conception
of the relationship of these two actualities so important in
the life of man.
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